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Foreword
At the time of adoption of the WTO Agreement in 1994 at Marrakesh, the view was
widely shared that the establishment of an effective mechanism for resolving disputes
through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSU) would make a significant contribution
to the strengthening of the multilateral trading system.  Experience with the working of
the DSU during the last eight years has turned to be highly satisfactory on the whole.
However, while no fundamental flaws have been found, on several aspects members have
felt the need for adjustments in the procedures.  It was in this context that the Ministries
agreed to the negotiations in the new round on improvements and clarifications of the
DSU.
Several proposals have been made in the negotiations seeking changes and elaboration of
the procedures contained in the DSU.  Mr. S. Narayanan, who was India’s Ambassador
and Permanent Representative to the WTO during the period 1995-2001, has evaluated
these proposals and made recommendations on the position that would be in the best
interest of India to adopt on some of the key proposals.  His approach is of gradualism
rather than of radical and rapid change.
We are thankful to The Sir Ratan Tata Trust for funding and supporting our research
work on WTO related issues.
Arvind Virmani




It  is  widely  recognised  that  the  contribution  of  the  WTO  Agreement  to  the
strengthening of the multilateral trading system has been significantly enhanced by the
establishment  of  an  effective  mechanism  for  resolving  disputes  through  the  Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU). The DSU introduced several new features in the pre-
existing  GATT  1947  system,  which  reinforces  the  quasi-judicial  character  of  the
mechanism. These include explicit time frames for the settlement of disputes, the right to
almost automatic establishment of a panel upon the request of a complaining party, the
automatic  adoption  of  panel  reports  unless  it  is  decided  by  consensus  not  to  adopt
(“negative  consensus  rule”),  the  establishment  of  a  standing  Appellate  Body  to  hear
appeals  from  panel  reports  and  stronger  procedures  for  implementation  of  panel  and
Appellate Reports, including the right to retaliation and specific rules on cross retaliation
in certain circumstances. On account of these features the DSU has provided the fastest
and most effective dispute resolution system available in any international organization. In
the new framework, an impressive amount of jurisprudence has been developed by the
panels and the Appellate Body within the very limited period of about eight years.
At  Marrakesh,  in  April  1994,  when  the  Ministers  adopted  by  consensus  the
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, there was some amount
of nervousness among the participating countries over the DSU on account of the fact that
several of the new features, and in particular the virtually automatic adoption of panel and
Appellate  Body  reports,  were  untested  in  practice.  Consequently,  one  of  the  decisions
adopted by the Ministers at Marrakesh was that the DSU would be reviewed within four
years, after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement and a decision taken on whether to
continue, modify or terminate the dispute settlement rules and procedures.     When this
review process was undertaken a number of suggestions were made for modifying some of
the provisions of the DSU but there was no suggestion to terminate the DSU.  Moreover,
during the review process, nobody even remotely suggested that the automaticity built into
the system by way of negative consensus rule in respect of adoption of panel and Appellate
Body reports needed to be changed.  The review process remained inconclusive, as there2
was no consensus on the suggestions.   During the Ministerial conference at Seattle, Japan
and EC with the support of a number of countries, proposed certain amendments to the
DSU to tackle some of the problems that had arisen in securing the implementation of the
decisions of the Dispute Settlement Body in individual cases.  However, the total collapse
of the Seattle Ministerial Conference prevented any serious discussion of the issue, let
alone acceptance of the proposals.
In the first eight years of its operation the DSU seems to have stood well the test of
time and the vicissitudes of resolving disputes involving the two largest trading Members.
It is fair to say that the WTO Members are on the whole satisfied with the working of the
DSU.  The Dispute Settlement mechanism is being extensively used by developed as well
as developing countries in order to protect their trade interests.  It is found that between
1.1.1995  and  31.3.2003,  the  total  number  of  complaints  notified  to  the  WTO  is  286
covering  about  207  standard  DSU  matters.      During  this  period  the  total  number  of
Appellate Body reports and panel reports adopted is 69 (Not including reports resulting
from proceedings pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU).  During this period, there were
mutually agreed solutions, in respect of 40 cases.  A statistical analysis shows that out of
286 complaints notified during the period, 179 were complaints by developed countries.
(111 against developed countries and 68 against developing countries).  During the same
period complaints by developing countries were 101.  (59 against developed countries and
42 against developing countries.    Six complaints were both by developed and developing
country Members, (all the six were against developed country Members).   The extensive
use of dispute settlement system both by developed and developing countries indicates that
Members find the system, prima facie, to be useful.  The developing countries have been
quite successful in their disputes against powerful developed Members of the WTO in
areas like textiles, anti-dumping and safeguards.  However, developing countries are also
facing a number of difficulties.  Implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB, especially by powerful Members of the WTO, has been far from satisfactory, thus
eroding the credibility of the system to some extent.  There is also a tendency on the part of
powerful developed Members to appeal against panel reports in a rather routine fashion,
which are adverse to them with a view to gain further time.   Thus, the process of dispute3
resolution is proving to be expensive as well as time consuming on the perspective of
developing country Members.
In the first two or three years, after the establishment of the WTO, the DSU was
being described as the jewel of the WTO.  However, subsequently when  some high-profile
disputes  (Bananas  and  Hormones  in  particular)  threw  up  new    challenges    there  was
recognition that while there was no major flaw in the system, it  was by no means perfect.
Members began to feel that some adjustments to the system were needed.  Since the review
process  had  remained  inconclusive,  during  the  preparatory  process  for  the  fourth
Ministerial Conference at Doha, the feeling grew among Members that the opportunity
provided through the possible launching of new negotiations in certain areas should be
utilized to initiate negotiations in respect of DSU also.
Accordingly the Doha Ministerial Declaration contained the following mandate on
negotiations in the area:
“We  agree  to  negotiations  on  improvements  and  clarifications  of  the  Dispute
Settlement Understanding.  The negotiations should be based on the work done thus far as
well as any additional proposals by Members, and aim to agree on improvements and
clarifications not later than May 2003, at which time we will take steps to ensure that the
results enter into force as soon as possible thereafter”.
In  calling  for  negotiations    “on  improvements  and  clarifications  of  the  dispute
settlement understanding” Ministers seem to have limited the scope of such negotiations.
The  idea  is  not  to  rewrite  DSU  or  to  bring  about  a  fundamental  change.  Only
improvements  and  clarifications  are  envisaged.    The  second  aspect  is  that  there  is  a
reference to “work done thus far”. This alludes in particular to the proposal given by a
group of countries during Seattle Ministerial Conference on tackling some of the issues
that had arisen.   The assessment at that time was that this proposal spearheaded by Japan
and EU had very good support.   Another important aspect of the mandate is that the
negotiations relating to DSU have been kept outside a single undertaking.  The idea is that
DSU negotiations should not become part and parcel of political compromises.4
At  the  negotiations  that  have  followed  developed  and  developing  countries
including India made several proposals for improvements and clarifications.  This study
looks at these proposals from the perspective of developing countries in general and India
in particular.  The objective of this paper is to critically examine the major proposals on the
table with a view to recommending the position that India should take in the negotiations.
It is obvious that any improvement and clarification that strengthens the DSU must in
principle be in the interest of developing countries, which depend more on the rule-based
trading system and hence have a greater stake in the system.
The paper is structured as follows. Part II gives a brief overview of the evolution of
the  dispute  settlement  machinery  in  GATT/WTO  and  Part  III  examines  in  detail  the
provisions of the DSU. Part IV contains a critical review of the proposals that have been
made and Part V summarizes the conclusions reached.
II  Evolution of the Dispute Settlement System under the GATT
II.1  Dispute Settlement in GATT 1947
GATT  1947,  as  originally  adopted  in  1948,  contained  elaborate  provisions  for
resolution of differences between contracting parties.  Several Articles of GATT, which
deal with individual obligations, specify arrangements for settling differences as well.  In
certain matters, only bilateral discussions were provided for and in some others there was
provision for recourse alternatively to bilateral consultations or to consultation with the
Contracting  Parties  (full  membership).    Certain  articles,  which  governed  specific
obligations, provide for multilateral consultation after bilateral efforts have failed while
others provide only for multilateral consultation.  In some of these provisions the effort to
solve differences did not go beyond bilateral and multilateral consultations, but in other
cases there was provision for compensatory withdrawal or suspension of concessions or
obligations.  Besides individual provisions, GATT also had a central dispute settlement
machinery in Articles XXII and XXIII and the procedures prescribed in them applied to all
obligations.  Article XXII and XXIII read as follows:5
Article XXII: Consultation:
1. Each  contracting  party  shall  accord  sympathetic  consideration  to,  and  shall  afford
adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made
by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of the
Agreement.
2.  The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party, consult
with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been
possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.
Article XXIII: Nullification or Impairment
1.  If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment
of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of;
a)  the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
b)  the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not
it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
c)  the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter,
make written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties
which it considers to be concerned.  Any contracting party thus approached shall
give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties  concerned
within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1
© of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred
to  them  and  shall  make  appropriate  recommendations  to  the  contracting  parties6
which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES  may  consult  with  contracting  parties,  with  the
Economic  and  Social  Council  of  the  United  National  and  with  any  appropriate
inter-governmental  organization  in  cases  where  they  consider  such  consultation
necessary.  If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are
serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or
parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such
concessions  or  other  obligations  under  this  Agreement  as  they  determine  to  be
appropriate in the circumstances.  If the application to any contacting party of any
concession or other obligation is in fact suspended,  that contracting party shall
then be free, not later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give written
notice to the Executive Secretary, (Director General) to the Contracting Parties of
its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect
upon the sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him.
II.2  Early Practice under GATT 1947
Article XXII provides for a broad authorization for consultation “with respect to
any matter affecting the operation of this “Agreement”.   Originally this Article contained
provision only for bilateral consultation between the contracting parties.  Subsequently, at
the Review Session, provision was made for consultation between a contracting party and
the Contracting Parties, when bilateral consultations fail.  In 1958, the Contracting Parties
adopted  the  procedures  for  consultation  under  Article  XXII  on  matters  affecting  the
interests of a number of Contracting Parties.  In terms of these procedures, a notification
obligation was imposed and a third party having substantial trade interests in the matter
was given the right to join the consultations.  Despite, the notification obligations imposed
by the 1958 procedures the tendency was to treat consultations as private affairs.  Article
XXII was generally made use of where it was felt that patient negotiations could yield the
results.  Where a contracting party felt its interests were seriously jeopardized and wanted
quicker relief, it took recourse to Article XXIII.  In spite of the language of Article XXIII
making it very broad in its application, in practice Article XXIII had been invoked only7
when there was a case of nullification or impairment of a benefit accruing to a contracting
party, whether because of a breach of GATT obligations, or through “non-violation”.
Right from the beginning the practice adopted by Contracting Parties, was to take
the assistance of a smaller body to investigate complaints.  In the early days of GATT, in
one or two cases, the Chairman of the Contracting Parties, was requested to investigate the
complaints.    After  this  initial  stage,  a  practice  of  referring  the  matter  for  detailed
examination to a working party was developed.  The approach of the working parties, was
of conciliation and compromise and not of adjudication.  After some time, the Contracting
Parties began to feel that the findings and recommendations of the working parties did not
meet the tests of objectivity and impartiality and they desired to have a procedure, which
was of at least quasi-judicial nature.  This resulted in the adoption of the panel system.
Initially,  the  practice  was  to  appoint  sessional  panels.    However,  from  1955  onwards,
Contracting Parties began to appoint ad hoc panels consisting of three to five persons
drawn from countries having no direct interest in the dispute.  As in the case of reports of
the working party the reports of the panels were treated as advisory opinions on the basis
of which the Contracting Parties made their findings and recommendations.
II.3  Special Procedures for Developing Countries
In  April  1966,  the  Contracting  Parties  adopted  special  procedures  for  cases  in
which a dispute was raised by a developing country against a developed country.   These
procedures  provided  for  three  new  important  elements  that  were  designed  to  help
developing countries.  After the failure of bilateral consultations there was a possibility of
mediation by the Director General to resolve the dispute.  If mediation efforts also failed
the aggrieved developing country acquired the right to get the matter referred to a panel.
Another significant element of the new procedure was that the Contracting Parties could
authorize  retaliatory  measures  by  the  developing  country  concerned,  and  in  addition,
consider further measures to resolve the matter if they found, on examination of the panel
report that the complaining developing country continues to suffer from nullification or
impairment  of  any  benefit  under  GATT,  1947.    In  spite  of  the  fact  that  these  special8
procedures,  for  developing  countries,  constituted  a  substantial  improvement  over  the
general procedures, the special procedures were not used extensively.
One of the results of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations was the,
“Understanding  Regarding  Notification,  Consultation,  Dispute  Settlement  and
Surveillance”,  which  was  adopted  in  1979.    This  Understanding  had  an  annex  titled
“Agreed  Description  of  the  Customary  Practice  of  GATT  in  the  Field  of  Dispute
Settlement (Article XXIII:2)”.  The primary aim of the Understanding with its Annexure
was  to  codify  the  customary  practice.    However,  certain  elements,  which  were  an
improvement over the customary practice, were also introduced in the “Understanding”.
Three years later, the 1982 Ministerial Declaration strengthened and clarified further the
various  elements  of  the  Understanding.    The  Understanding  contained  an  optional
provision for conciliation in the event of failure of bilateral consultation.  The Ministerial
Declaration elaborated the provision further by providing for conciliation by the Director
General or by an individual or a group of persons nominated by the Director General.  But
neither the Understanding nor the Ministerial Declaration prescribed any time limit for the
process of conciliation.  The Understanding did not establish a right to the constitution of a
panel.  It provided for early constitution of panels without indicating any specific time-
frame.  It reinforced the element of mediation even in the generally quasi-judicial panel
procedure by requiring the panel to consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and
give  them  adequate  opportunity  to  develop  a  mutually  satisfactory  solution.    It  also
provided for circulation to the parties of descriptive part of the report and the conclusions
before they were circulated to the Contracting Parties.  However, it did not provide for any
rigid time limit for completion of panel proceedings.  The Understanding stated that on
receipt of the panel report the Contracting Parties would give it prompt consideration and
take appropriate action within a reasonable period of time.
Besides codification of the customary practice of GATT in regard to its Dispute
Settlement  Machinery,  the  Tokyo  Round  also  established  independent  procedures  for
consultation and dispute settlement in five of the six agreements on non-tariff measures
namely,  Agreements  on  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade,  Government  Procurement,9
Interpretation  and  Application  of  Articles  VI,  XVI  and  XXIII  (Subsidies  Code,)
Implementation of Article VII (Customs Valuation Code) and Implementation of Article
VI (Anti Dumping Code).  There were significant differences between the procedures set
out in the agreements on non-tariff measures and those of the Understanding.  All the five
codes provided for a right of a constitution of a panel after the failure of conciliation, while
the  Understanding  did  not.    All  the  five  codes  prescribed  specific  time  limits  to  be
observed by the panels to submit their reports, though the individual time limits varied.
Because of the explicit right to a panel as well as time limits for different stages of panel
procedures, the conditions of access to the panel procedures as embodied in the five codes
were far better than  the Understanding.
In the period following the Tokyo Round there was a large increase in recourse to
Article XXIII:2.  These disputes brought out some of the limitations of the procedures,
which  were  codified  during  the  Tokyo  Round.    Therefore,  the  subject  of  Dispute
Settlement received considerable attention during the preparation of Ministerial Meeting of
1982.  Concern was expressed at the delays in selection of panelists, time taken by panel to
submit their reports, mixing up of role of mediation and role of adjudication by the panels,
blocking of panel reports by interested parties.
II.4  The Uruguay Round
During the Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations relating to Dispute Settlement the
objective of the negotiators was to remove the weaknesses experienced in implementing
Dispute  Settlement  procedures  under  GATT,  1947.      The  establishment  of  panels  and
adoption of panel reports had become a major problem under the GATT, 1947 because of
the propensity of some powerful Contracting Parties to delay establishment of panels and
block adoption of panel reports.  The feeling was widely shared that there was an urgent
need to make the Dispute Settlement process more judicial and less political.   Following
the Mid Term Review Meeting of the Uruguay Round, it was decided to make operational
certain  improvements  on  which  agreement  had    already  been  reached  during  the
negotiations  without  waiting  for  the  conclusion  of  negotiations.  Accordingly,  the
Contracting  Parties  adopted  the    “Decision  on  Improvements  to  the  GATT  dispute10
settlement rules and procedures” on 12 April, 1989 on a trial basis for being applied from
1.1.1989 till the end of Uruguay Round.  One of the significant elements of this decision
was  that  the  establishment  of  a  panel  became  automatic  in  the  second  meeting  of  the
Council.  However, in respect of adoption of panel reports this decision did not change the
practice of adoption by consensus, although it contained an exhortation that  “the delaying
of the process of dispute settlement shall be avoided” directed mainly towards powerful
contracting parties.
At the end of Uruguay Round of negotiations, an “Understanding on Rules and
Procedures governing settlement of disputes” (DSU) was adopted and this is included in
Annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing World Trade Organisation (WTO).
The Dispute Settlement Understanding, which is now one of the WTO agreements,
has  four  important  features  designed  to  strengthen  very  substantially  the  quasi-judicial
nature of process.  They are (a) right to a panel; (b) rigid time limits for various stages; (c)
introduction of an Appeal process; (d) automaticity in adoption of panel/Appellate Body
reports.  The main features of the Understanding are examined in the next part.
III  An Analysis of the Provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
Article  1  specifies  the  coverage  and  application  of  the  Dispute  Settlement
Understanding (DSU).  It is mentioned that the rules and procedures shall apply to disputes
in  respect  of  all  agreements  (called  covered  agreements),  listed  in  Appendix  1  to  the
Understanding. The Appendix contains the Agreement establishing the WTO, Annex 1A,
1B, 1C, 2, and 4 of the Agreement establishing the WTO.  Thus, the only WTO agreement
not covered by the DSU is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, obviously because the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism is not intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of
specific  obligations  under  the  agreements  or  for  dispute  settlement  procedures.    This
Article also clarifies that the rules and procedures of the DSU shall apply subject to such
special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement understanding contained in
the covered agreements as were identified in Appendix 2.  In a way, one can say that11
Appendix  2,  is  an  indication  of  the  extent  to  which  the  integrated  dispute  settlement
understanding derogates from the objective of “Integrated Understanding”.  For instance,
one of the special or additional rules listed in Appendix 2, relates to certain provisions of
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.  The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing has
established a Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB) in order to supervise the implementation of
the ATC, to examine all measures taken under the ATC and their conformity with the
provisions  of  the  ATC.    Therefore,  any  dispute  based  on  the  alleged  violation  of  the
provision of the ATC, has to be dealt by the TMB first, and a WTO Member can bring the
matter before the DSB only if the matter remains unresolved even after the issue of a
recommendation by the TMB.  Similarly, Annex 2, provides for expedited procedures in
respect  of  subsidies  agreement.      It  is  further  clarified,  that  if  there  is  any  difference
between the rules and procedures contained in the main understanding and those contained
in Appendix 2, then the latter prevail.
Article 2, provides for the establishment of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
This provision states that the DSB shall have the authority to establish panels, adopt panel
and  Appellate  Body  reports,  maintain  surveillance  of  implementation  of  rulings  and
recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions under the obligations under the
covered  agreements.    Its  provision  also  states  that  in  respect  of  a  plurilateral  trade
agreement  only  those  Members  that  are  parties  to  the  Agreement  can  participate  in
decisions or actions taken by the DSB with respect to that dispute.  Paragraph 4 of this
Article contains a very important stipulation.  It stipulates that DSB can take decisions only
by consensus.  In other words, this specific rule relating to decision making in DSB, is a
departure from the general decision making rule contained in Article IX, of the Marrakesh
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.   In DSB, decisions have to be
taken only by consensus, and there is no provision for voting in the absence of consensus.
Article 3, contains general provisions. This Article affirms Members’ adherence to
the principles for the management of disputes applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of
GATT 1947, and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and modified through the
dispute settlement understanding.  Paragraph 2, of this Article states that DSU serves to12
preserve  the  rights  and  obligations  of  Members  under  the  covered  agreements  and  to
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements, in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law.   It is basing on this provision that the Appellate
Body  has  made  extensive  use  of  the  Vienna  Treaty  of  Interpretations  in  dealing  with
disputes.  Paragraph 2, also states that recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot
add to or diminish the rights and other obligations provided in the covered agreements.
However, many WTO Members feel the recommendations and rulings of the Appellate
Body have an impact on their rights and obligations.  Paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Article
deal  with  what  are  known  as  mutually  agreed  solutions.    There  are  two  stipulations
attached to mutually agreed solutions:  (i) mutually agreed solutions have to be consistent
with those agreements under which the matter was formerly raised and shall not nullify or
impair  benefits  accruing  to  any  Member  under  those  agreements,  not  impede  the
attainment of any objective of those agreements;  (2) mutually agreed solutions have to be
notified to the DSB promptly.  The idea behind these stipulations is that mutually agreed
solutions between parties should not adversely affect the interest of other Members and
that  such  solutions  should  not  be  inconsistent  with    the  provisions  of  the  relevant
agreements.  Under paragraph 8 of this Article, there is normally a presumption that a
breach  of  the  rules  has  an  adverse  impact  on  other  Members  parties  to  that  covered
agreement and therefore, it is up to the Member against whom the complaint has been
brought to rebut the charge.  Para 9, recognizes that the dispute settlement rights of the
Members are  without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  Members  to  seek  and  adopt  collective
interpretations  of  any  provision  of  the  WTO  agreement  as  well  as  multilateral  trade
agreements  as  envisaged  in  Article  IX.2  of  the  Marrakesh  Agreement  establishing  the
World  Trade  Organization.    Para  10  envisages  that  Members  will  engage  in  dispute
settlement procedures in good faith, in an effort to resolve the dispute.
Article 4, of the DSU deals with consultations.  This Article requires Members to
enter  into  consultations  with  each  other  and  to  give  sympathetic  consideration  to  the
representations  made  concerning  measures  affecting  the  operation  of  any  covered
agreement.    Paragraph  4,  provides  for  strict  time  periods  for  the  consultation  process.
Paragraph 6, envisages that consultation should be confidential.  All consultations are to be13
notified to the DSB.  If however, the consultation does not result in any fruitful result, then
the Agreed party may  ask  for  the  establishment  of  a  panel  so  that  the  matter  may  be
adjudicated upon.  Paragraph 8,  provides for accelerated time frames in respect of disputes
involving  perishable  goods.    Paragraph  10,  states  that  during  consultations  Members
should give special attention to the particular problems and interests of developing country
Members.  It is worth noting that the language of this paragraph is non binding and non
operational.  Paragraph 11, provides for participation of third parties in the consultation
process  subject  to  certain  stipulations.  First,  the  Member  concerned  should  notify  its
interest to the consulting Members and the DSB within the stipulated time period of its
interest to be joined in the consultations.  Second, the Member to which the request for
consultation is addressed agrees that the claim of substantial interest made by the third
party is well founded.  In practice Members, wishing to be joined in the consultations as
third parties in different disputes have had many frustrations with the operations of this
paragraph.  The way this paragraph is currently worded, the Member to whom the request
for consultations is addressed is the soul authority to decide as to whether another Member
has substantial interest or  not  in  the  matter  and  thus  accept  or  deny  the  claim  of  that
Member to be considered as a third party.
Article  5  states  that  good  offices,  conciliation  and  mediation  be  undertaken
voluntarily if the parties so agree.  This Article also provides that the Director General may
offer good offices, conciliation or mediation with a view to assisting Members to settle a
dispute.
Article  6  deals  with  the  establishment  of  panels.    This  Article  gives  the
complaining  party  the  right  to  have  a  Panel  established  if  it  so  desires.    The  only
implication of this provision is that the defending party can block the establishment of a
panel in the first meeting.  However, if the complaining party repeats its request a second
time the panel gets automatically established.  The legalistic language in which paragraph
1 of Article 6 is worded has given rise to differing interpretations regarding “at the latest at
the DSB Meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB’s
agenda”.   However, it is fair to say that if the complaining party is serious about getting a14
panel established, he can get it done at the second meeting of the DSB.  Many WTO
Members are of the view that a complaining party must have the right to  get  a  panel
established in the very same meeting of the DSB in which it makes a request.  Paragraph 2
of Article 6, indicates the details to be contained in the panels requests.
Article 7 of the DSB deals with terms of  reference of panels  and indicates the
language for standard terms of reference.
Article 8 deals with the composition of the panels. The panels shall be composed of
well qualified government and/or non governmental individuals, persons who have served
as a representative of the WTO Member or in the secretariat, and individuals who have
taught or published on international trade or policy etc. Panels shall normally be composed
of three Members, unless the parties agree otherwise, in which case the panel will consist
of five members.  The secretariat will maintain an indicative list of panelist from which
panelists may be drawn.  The panelists are to serve in their individual capacity and not as
representatives  of  the  governments  or  organizations.    Nationals  of  Members  whose
governments are involved in the dispute are not to serve on the panel unless the parties
agree otherwise.  If there is a dispute between a developing country and developed country,
and the developing country so requests, the panel shall include at least one panelist from a
developing country Member.  Normally, the parties to the dispute are expected to agree on
the names of the panelists based on the nominations proposed by the Secretariat.  If there is
no agreement on the panelists, within 20 days after the date of the establishment of the
panel, at the request of either party, the director general shall determine the composition of
the panel in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman of the relevant
council of committee.  While Article 8, relating to composition of panels appears simple
and straight forward, in practice the task of composition of panel has become extremely
difficult because of the tendency of some  Members to be extremely choosy and cautious
in  accepting  individuals  as  panelists.    This  has  resulted  in  two  things:  (i)  the  panel
composition is taking lot of time and very rarely a panel is formed within twenty days of
the date of establishment of the panel. (ii) increasingly the composition of the panel is
being determined not on the basis of mutual agreement between the parties, but on the15
basis of DG’s determination.  There are some Members who feel that the present system of
composition of panels is flawed and that it requires review.
Article 9 deals with procedures for multiple complaints.  This Article envisages that
a single panel may look into multiple complaints related to the same matter.  If more than
one panel is established to examine the complaints related to the same matter, to the extent
possible, the same persons shall serve as panelists on each of the separate panels and the
time table for the panel process in such disputes should be harmonized.
Article 10 deals with third parties.  This Article provides that any Member having a
substantial interest in a matter of before a panel should notify its interest to the DSB. Such
a  Member  will  have  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  by  the  panel  and  to  make  written
submission to the panel. Such third party submissions will be given to the party to the
dispute and will also be reflected in the panel report.  The Article further provides that
third parties can receive the first submission of the parties.  This Article also provides that
the third party has the right to take recourse to normal dispute settlement procedures if it
considers that a measure already the subject of the panel proceeding nullifies or impairs
benefits accruing to it under any covered agreement.   There is lot of dissatisfaction among
WTO members about the limited scope of rights given to third parties under this Article.
Article 11 deals with the function of the panels. According to the Appellate Body
this Article also indicates the standard of review to be adopted by the panel.  According to
this Article, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including
an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity
with relevant covered agreements and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in
making  the  recommendations  or  in  giving  the  rulings  provided  for  in  the  covered
agreements.
Article 12 deals with panel procedures.  According to this Article, panels should
follow  the  working  procedures  contained  in  Appendix  3,  unless  the  panel  decides
otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute.  This Article envisages that the panel16
should produce its final report within six months of its establishment.  The time period is
three months in cases of urgency including those relating to perishable goods.   Paragraph
9 of this Article provides for the outer time limit for panel report and it is nine months.
Paragraph 11 provides that if one or more of the parties is a development country Member,
the panels report should indicate the form in which account has been taken of relevant
provisions of differential and more favourable treatment for developing countries that form
part of the covered agreements which have been raised by the developing country Member.
It is worthwhile noting here that while the language of para 11 is mandatory; it is not in
operational terms.  Therefore, no real benefit accrues to developing countries because of
this paragraph.
Article  13  gives  specific  authority  to  panels  to  seek  information  and  technical
advice from any individual or body which the panel deals appropriate.  This Article also
provides  that  panels  may  seek  information  from  any  relevant  source  and  may  consult
experts to obtain opinion on certain aspects of the matter.  It is worthwhile noting here that
Article 13 is relevant only for panels and that prima facie this Article enables panels to
seek technical advice and expert opinion whenever it desires to do so.  The Appellate Body
has interpreted this Article, as enabling panels as well as the Appellate Body, to deal with
unsolicited Amicus Curiae Briefs.  This interpretation of Article 13 by the Appellate Body,
has proved to be highly confidential.
Article 14 provides that panel deliberations are to be confidential and that opinion
expressed by individual panelists are to be anonymous.
Article 15 stipulates that the panel should issue an interim report for consideration
of parties before a final report is finalized.  This Article also stipulates that the final report
shall include a discussion of the arguments of the parties at the interim review stage.  Many
WTO Members appear to hold a view that the interim review stage in the panel process is
one that could be easily dispensed with, with a view to make  the  panel  process  more
expeditious.  In practice there has not even a single case, where a panel has made major
changes in its findings on the basis of comments received from the parties at the interim17
review stage.  At best, the panels have attempted to strengthen their reports on the basis of
comments, received at the interim review stage.   This has resulted in a situation where
some Members see merit in not offering comments on the interim report and attacking the
weaknesses in the panel report at the appeal stage.
Article 16 deals with adoption of panel reports.  The most important aspect of this
Article is that the negative consensus rule applies to adoption of Panel reports. That is, the
panel report shall be adopted by the DSB unless the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt the report.  This represents a fundamental change from the system that is prevailing
during the GATT period.  In the new framework provided by the DSU a losing party does
not have the capacity to block the adoption of the panel report.  The negative consensus
rule ensures automatic adoption of panel/Appellate Body reports (adoption of Appellate
Body reports is also governed by negative consensus rule).  It is seen that since inception
of the WTO all panel and/or Appellate Body reports have been adopted on the basis of
negative  consensus  rule.    At  this  point  of  time,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  visualize  a
situation where DSB would decide by consensus not to adopt a panel or Appellate Body
report since the prevailing party in the dispute would never be willing to be a party to such
a  decision.    Article  16  also  provides  that  Members  should  be  given  20  days  time  to
consider the panel report and that the panel report should be adopted within 60 days of its
issuance to the Members of the DSB.  In other words, the adoption of the panel report has
to take place between 21 and 60 days of its issuance.  However, the final report will not be
adopted if one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its intentions to
appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.
Article 17, deals with the subject of Appellate Review of the appeals filed from
panel cases.  This article provides for the establishment of a standing Appellate Body.
Under the old GATT system there was no provision for appeal for panel reports.  During
the Uruguay Round Negotiations, negotiators felt that since the new system provides for
automatic adoption of panel reports, there should be scope for appeal in situations wherein
panels misinterpret the legal provisions.  Therefore, it was decided to set up a standing
Appellate Body with the stipulation that the scope of an appeal should be limited to issues18
of  law,  covered  in  the  panel  report  and  legal  interpretations  developed  by  the  panel.
Article 17 also provides that the Appellate Body shall be composed of seven persons, three
of whom shall serve on any one case and they shall serve by rotation.  The Appellate Body
Members are to be appointed for a four year term and may be reappointed only once.  The
Article also stipulates that the Appellate Body Members should be persons of recognized
authority, with demonstrative expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of
covered agreements generally.  Para 5 of the article provides that the Appellate Body shall
conclude its deliberations normally within 60 days but in any case not later than 90 days
from the date of notification.  Para 13 of the  article states that the Appellate Body can
uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.  The adoption of
Appellate Body reports is on the basis of negative consensus rule (as is the case with the
adoption of panel reports).  Para 4 of the Article states that only parties to the dispute and
not third parties can appeal a panel report.  Para 9 of the Article give the authority to the
Appellate Body to drop the working procedures in consultation with the Chairman of the
DSB and the director general and communicate the working procedures to the Members
for their information.
Article 18 deals with the communication with  the panel on the Appellate Body.
This article requires that all communication addressed to the panel or Appellate Body,
concerning  matters  under  consideration  shall  be  treated  as  confidential,  but  should  be
communicated to the other side.  However, a party to a dispute is not precluded from
disclosing  statements  of  its  own  position  to  the  public.    This  is  meant  to  ensure
transparency.  This article also stipulates that a party to a dispute should, upon request of a
Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written
submissions that could be disclosed to the public.  Experience has given rise to two types
of concerns regarding this article.  There is no prescribed time limit within which a party to
a dispute should provide, on request, a non-confidential summary of its submissions.  The
second concern relates to the material provided by the WTO secretariat to the panels.  This
material is not available to the parties to the dispute and this raises issues relating to due
process.19
Article 19, provides that the panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure
is inconsistent with the covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned
brings the measure into conformity with that agreement.  It is further mentioned that in
addition to its recommendations, the panel of the Appellate Body may suggest ways in
which  the  Member  concerned  could  implement  the  recommendation.    In  practice,
sometimes panels have suggested ways in which the Member concerned could implement
the  recommendations.    However,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  while  the  only  possible
recommendation of the panel or the Appellate Body is that the Member concerned bring
the measure into conformity with the relevant agreement and it  is absolutely binding on
the Member concerned, the panel on the Appellate Body has the discretion to suggest ways
in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendation and the suggestion
regarding ways of implementation is not binding on the  Member concerned.
Article 20 provides for time frames for DSB decisions.  The period provided is 9
months where there is no appeal and it is 12 months where there is appeal.
Article 21 deals with the surveillance of implementation of recommendations and
rulings of the DSB.  Para 1 of this article lays emphasis on the need for prompt compliance
with the recommendation or the rulings of the DSB.  Para 2 is a provision in favour of
developing countries but this provision does not have  much operational content or binding
effect.  Para 3 requires that a Member shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, within 30 days of the
adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report.  Members are entitled to a reasonable
period of time to do so.  This article also provides as to how the reasonable period of time
can be arrived at either through mutual agreement between the parties or through binding
arbitration.  The normal period for implementation is 15 months from the date of adoption
of a panel or Appellate Body report.  Para 5 of the article provides for establishment of a
compliance panel where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a
covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings.
The phrase in this article “through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures” has
given rise to differing interpretations like as to whether consultations should precede the20
request for the establishment of a compliance panel, whether the consultation period is
sixty days, whether the establishment of the compliance panel is mandatory only at the
time of the second request and whether there could be an appeal against the finding of a
compliance panel.  Para 6 provides for surveillance of the adopted recommendations or
ruling.  The issue of implementation shall be kept on the agenda of the DSB meeting six
months after the expiry of reasonable period of time and shall remain on the agenda until
the  issue  is  resolved.    The  Member  concerned  has  to  give  a  status  report  on  the
implementation at least 10 days prior to each meeting.
Article  22  deals  with  compensation  and  suspension  of  concessions.  If  the
recommendations or rulings are not implemented a Member may receive compensation or
suspend concessions or other obligations in relation to the other Member.  However, these
are temporary measures without prejudice to the obligations to the Member concerned to
bring  the  measure  into  conformity  with  the  covered  agreements.    Compensation  is
voluntary  and  if  granted,  shall  be  consistent  with  the  covered  agreements.  Where  a
Member fails to negotiate an acceptable compensation then the Member may invite the
DSB to authorize the suspension of concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements, if such a course is not prohibited in that covered agreement.  Para 3, provides
that the complaining party may seek suspension of concessions with respect to the same
sector  as  that  in  which  the  panel  or  Appellate  Body  has  found  a  violation  or  other
nullification or impairment of its rights.  If that is not practicable or effective, it may seek
suspension  under  the  same  agreement;  failing  which  it  may  seek  suspension  in  other
sectors under another covered agreement.   Paragraph 6 provides that when  a losing party
fails to bring the measure into compliance with the relevant covered agreement and when
there is no mutually acceptable compensation decided upon, then on the request of the
prevailing  party  the  DSB  shall  grant  authorization  to  suspend  concessions  or  other
obligations and the DSB shall decide this issue on the basis of negative consensus rule.
The relationship of Article 22.6 with Article 21.5 has been the most debated subject under
the DSU and this is known as a sequencing issue.  Article 22.6 states that the authorization
to suspend concessions for other obligations shall be granted within 30 days of the expiry
of the reasonable period of time.  Some delegations have argued that if they have to wait21
for the compliance panel constituted under Article 21.5 to give its findings before taking
the recourse to Article 22.6, they will lose their right to suspend concessions since in terms
of  Article  22.6  the  DSB  has  to  grant  authorization  within  30  days  of  the  expiry  of
reasonable period of time and since the compliance panel has 90 days time to submit its
report after the date of referral of the matter to it. According to these delegations therefore
multilateral  determination  of  compliance  and  non-compliance  is  not  a  prerequisite  for
taking recourse to Article 22.6.  Article 22.6 while providing for the  grant of authorization
to suspend concessions or other obligations almost automatically, also provides that if the
Member concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed or claims that the principles
and procedures indicated in para 3 have not been followed the matter shall be referred to
arbitration.  Normally, the original panel shall do such arbitration and the arbitrators shall
complete their work within 60 days after the date of expiry of a reasonable period of time.
Article 23 is designed to strengthen the multilateral trading system.  Article 24 deals with
special procedures for least developed country Members.  Article 25 deals with arbitration
as an alternative means of dispute settlement.  This article clearly provides that resort to
arbitration  shall  be  subject  to  mutual  agreement  of  the  parties.    Article  26  prescribes
procedures regarding non-violation complaints.  Article 27 deals with the responsibilities
of the secretariat in dispute settlement matters.
IV  Review of Proposals relating to
IV.1  Permanent Body of Panelists
In  the  ongoing  negotiations  aimed  at  improvements  and  clarifications  of  the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the European communities have come out with
a  major  proposal  relating  to  establishment  of  a  permanent  body  of  panelists.  Some
delegations characterize this as “professionalisation of the panel system”.
Article 8 of the DSU deals with the subject of composition of panels.  Article 8 (1)
indicates the type of background “well qualified governmental and/or non-governmental
panelists” should have.  This provision while describing different types of background
which a panelist should have, is worded in such a way that it is not restrictive.  Article 8(2)22
provides that panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence
of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience.
Article  8(3)  provides  that  citizens  of  Members  whose  governments  are  parties  to  the
dispute or third parties as defined in Paragraph 2 of Article 10 shall not serve on a panel
concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise.  Article 8(4)
provides for maintenance, by the secretariat, of an indicative list of governmental and non-
governmental individuals from which panelists may be drawn as appropriate.  Article 8 (5)
provides that a panel should normally consist of three persons unless parties to the dispute
agree for a panel of 5 members.   Article 8 (6) envisages that the Secretariat should propose
nominations for the panel to the parties to dispute and that the parties to the dispute shall
not oppose nominations except for compelling reasons.  Article 8(7) provides that if there
is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of the establishment of the
panel,  at  the  request  of  either  parties,  the  Director  General  should  determine  the
composition.  Article 8(10) provides that when a dispute is between a developing country
Member  and  a  developed  country  Member,  the  panel  shall,  if  the  developing  country
Member so requests, include at least one panelist from a developing country Member.
The European Communities have in their proposals explained the reasons as to why
they seek a change in the procedure relating to composition of panels and want to move
from ad hoc to a system of more permanent panelists.    The main reasons given by the EC
can be summarized as;
a)  a more permanent system of panelists is  likely  to lead to faster procedures
and increase the quality of panel reports.
b)  There  is  growing  discrepancy  between  the  need  for  panelists  and  the
availability of ad hoc panelists.  There  are many more panels under the
WTO than in GATT.  Furthermore, total duration of the cases is increasing,
because of the frequent recourse to compliance panels and to arbitration on
the suspension of concessions, procedures which are normally handled by
the original panelists.  On the supply side it has proved more and more
difficult  to  find  qualified  panelists  who  are  not  nationals  of  Members
involved  in  the  dispute.    The  mismatch  between  demand  and  supply  is
resulting in delay in selection of panelists and increasing dependence on the
DG for the selection of panelists.  A permanent system of panelists will23
reduce the time required for selecting panelists and the time just gained
could be allocated to other parts of the Panel procedure.
c)  The increased complexity of the substance of the cases brought before the
panels both from a factual and a legal point of view results in a situation
where  panelists  appointed  under  the  present  ad  hoc  system  come  under
greater strain.
d)  A  permanent  system  of  panelists  would  enhance  the  legitimacy  and
credibility of the panel process in the eyes of the public.
e)  The  System  of  permanent  panelists  can  be  used  to  ensure  greater
involvement of panelists from developing countries
f)  A more permanent system of panelists would lead to faster proceedings and
better and more consistent rulings.
EC being the main proponent of the system of permanent panelists has advanced
arguments as indicated above to justify its proposal.  There may be some truth in each of
the arguments given by EC.  At the same time it is possible to pick holes in at least some of
the arguments of EC.   But what is needed is an overall and balanced view of  the proposal.
It is no exaggeration to say that many trade diplomats, legal experts involved in the
WTO system, as well as academics are extremely concerned with the present arrangements
relating to the  composition of panels. There is a widespread perception  that  the  WTO
secretariat  plays  an  unduly  important  role  in  the  selection  of  panelists  and  that  the
secretariat, willy nilly, comes under certain amount of pressure from one major delegation
during the process of selection of panelists.  Many legal experts including some former
Appellate Body members feel that the panelists selected under the current ad hoc system
do  not  have  adequate  time  or  background  or  necessary  legal  expertise  to  deal  with
complicated cases.  It is fair to say that, the present system appears to give too much of
discretion to the Secretariat in the matter of selection of panelists.  It is also the general
experience  of  at  least  some  of  the  developing  country  delegations  that  one  major
delegation, whenever it is the respondent in a dispute tries to delay the composition of the
panel as much as possible resulting in a situation where the complainant has no choice
except  to  seek  DG’s  intervention.    Obviously,  DG  who  is  burdened  with  far  more24
important items of work depends upon the Deputy Director General concerned as well as
Directors  and  others  concerned  in  the  choice  of  panelists.    Experience  shows  that  the
choice of panelists by the DG has not been as objective and as broad based as one would
have expected.  This is because the secretariat is able to influence the process in two ways.
(a) It is the secretariat, which initially suggests names for consideration by virtue of Article
8 (6) of the DSU.  The Secretariat guards its power in this area very zealously and views a
situation  where the parties to the dispute directly get in touch with each other in order to
arrive at mutually acceptable names as not supported by the provision of DSU.  If the
names proposed by the secretariat are not acceptable to one or more parties, then it is the
secretariat, which decides the final composition. Thus, there is no way a person who is not
suggested by the secretariat or who is not acceptable to the secretariat (what ever be the
reason) can become a panelist.  (b)  the concept of indicative list of panelists found in the
DSU was designed to provide a large number of names from which the  secretariat can
choose  panelists.    There  are  a  large  number  of  names  available  in  the  indicative  list.
However,  experience  shows  that  some  of  the  eminent  legal  experts  whose  names  are
included in the indicative lists have not been proposed even once by the secretariat for
consideration of the parties to the dispute during the last seven years.  It is also seen that
some diplomats are repeatedly proposed by the secretariat for panels. These circumstances
have created a general perception that certain amount of good will of the secretariat is
necessary if one is to be considered by the secretariat for being proposed as a panelist.
It should also be conceded, in fairness to the EC that the present system of ad hoc
panelists is resulting in a situation where at least some of the panelists are not able to
devote enough time for the tasks before them and therefore the panelists inevitably depend
on the Secretariat for guidance/support.
In view of the above, it is obvious, that the present system of ad hoc panelists needs
to be revised with a view to bring about greater degree of professionalism and a reduced
role for the Secretariat in the choice of panelists.  The main proposal for changes in the
panel system has come from EC.  The original proposal of EC is contained in document25
No.  T/DS/W/1  dated  13  March,  2002.    EC  has  subsequently  modified  its  proposals
slightly.
1. Panels shall be composed of three individuals included on the roster of panelists
established by the DSB.   The panelists shall be appointed by the DG on a
random basis within 5 days from the establishment of the panel.
2. Notwithstanding  paragraph  1,  the  parties  may  agree  at  the  time  of  the
establishment of the panel that panels may include up to two individuals from
outside the roster with particular expertise on the subject matter of the dispute.
The Chairman of the panel shall always be an individual included on the roster
of panelists and will be appointed by the DG on a random basis within 5 days
from the establishment of the panel.  The parties may agree on the individuals
outside the roster to serve on the  panel or request the Director-General, in
consultation with the parties and the Chairman of the panel to nominate these
individuals.  If no agreement has been reached on the panelists from outside the
roster or no request for their nomination to the DG has been made within 10
days  from  the  establishment  of  the  panel,  at  the  request  of  a  party,  those
members of the  panel shall be drawn from the roster by the DG on a random
basis….
3. The roster shall include a number of persons as determined from tie to time by
the General Council.  The DSB shall include persons on the roster for six-year
terms and no person shall be re-appointed.  However, the terms for the initial
inclusion on the roster shall be either [three, four, five or six years], with an
equal number appointed for each period, as determined by lot [and with those
appointed for [three or four] years eligible exceptionally for re-appointment to
six-year terms].  The roster should comprise persons of recognized authority,
with demonstrated expertise in international trade law, economy or policy and
the subject matter of the covered agreements generally, and /or past experience
as a GATT/WTO panelist.  It shall be broadly representative of membership in26
the  WTO.    All  persons  included  on  the  roster  shall  stay  abreast  of  dispute
settlement activities and other relevant activities of the WTO.
4.  Within  three  months  after  establishment  of  the  initial  roster,  the  panelists
included  on  the  roster  shall  draw  up  rules  on  conflict  of  interests  to  be
applicable  to  the  permanent  panelists  in  the  exercise  of  their  duties  and  in
determining their suitability to serve in any particular dispute.  Such rules shall
be drawn up in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-
General, and submitted to the DSB for adoption.
5.  Panelists  shall  serve  in  their  individual  capacities  and  not  as  government
representatives,  nor  as  representatives  of  any  organization.    Members  shall
therefore not give them instructions nor seek to influence them as individuals
with regard to matters before a panel.
6.  The  panelists  included  on  the  roster  may  draw  up  additional  working
procedures for panels as necessary to the extent not already provided for the
DSU.  Such procedures shall be drawn up in consultation with the Chairman of
the DSB and the Director General, and submitted to the DSB for adoption.
7.  Panelists shall be provided with appropriate administrative and legal support as
required.
8.  The expenses of panelists shall be met from the WTO budget in accordance
with criteria to be adopted by the General Council, based on recommendations
of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration.
9.  Within  three  months  after  establishment  of  the  initial  roster,  the  panelists
included  on  the  roster  shall  draw  up  rules  on  conflict  of  interests  to  be
applicable  to  the  permanent  panelists  in  the  exercise  of  their  duties  and  in
determining their suitability to serve in any particular dispute.  Such rules shall27
be drawn up in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-
General, and submitted to the DSB for adoption.
10.  Panelists  shall  serve  in  their  individual  capacities  and  not  as  government
representatives,  nor  as  representatives  of  any  organization.    Members  shall
therefore not give them instructions nor seek to influence them as individuals
with regard to matters before a panel.
11.  The  panelists  included  on  the  roster  may  draw  up  additional  working
procedures for panels as necessary to the extent not already provided for the
DSU.  Such procedures shall be drawn up in consultation with the Chairman of
the DSB and the Director General, and submitted to the DSB for adoption.
12.  Panelists shall be provided with appropriate administrative and legal support as
required.
13.  The expenses of panelists shall be met from the WTO budget in accordance
with criteria to be adopted by the General Council, based on recommendations
of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration.
  
The first major concern with EC’s proposal is that all panelists in future will be
chosen from a group of 15-24 individuals.  Currently, in the indicative list of panelists,
there are about 500-600 names.  Moreover, there is no bar on selecting individuals whose
names do not figure in the indicative list as panelists.  It is going to be a very difficult job
to arrive at a permanent panel of 15-24 names.  Another worrying aspect is that some
major delegations may effectively veto some individuals who are known for their fierce
independence  and  refusal  to  yield  to  any  type  of  pressure.    Therefore,  the  system  of
permanent panelists might mean that we restrict the area of selection to a limited number
of 15-24 individuals with the additional risk that these individuals, while they may possess
legal and technical expertise, may not necessarily be well known for their independence28
and capacity to resist pressure.  Thus, EC’s proposal in a way amounts to leap into the
unknown.
Other  countries  who  have  submitted  proposals  regarding  permanent  roster  of
panelists are Thailand, Canada and the African group.
Thailand’s proposal envisages minimum departure from the present system.  This
system envisages approval of a roster of panel chairs by the DSB comprised of individuals
who may be appointed as Chair of a Panel by lot.  According to Thailand, in addition to
retaining  the  current  practice  (i.e.  mutual  agreement  on  a  complete    panel  based  on
nominations proposed by the secretariat  or panel composition by the DG at the request of
either party), a further option would be provided that allows a party to request that the
panel chair be appointed by lot.  Following appointment of the panel chair, the parties can
continue with the process of panel composition based on nominations proposed by the
secretariat or DG appointment of the remaining  panelists.    According  to  Thailand,  the
system has the following benefits.
1. Parties will have greater control over the panel composition process, and will
retain  the  right  to  have  the  panel  composed  within  30  days  of  panel
establishment
2. Parties  retain  the  possibility  of  agreeing  on  panelists  nominated  by  the
Secretariat, and have the option of a more flexible automatic system for panel
composition, supplemented by a more dedicated and experienced pool of Panel
Chairs.
3. Parties have the added option of having an experienced Panel Chair appointed
at any stage during the panel composition process, while retaining the ability to
agree on panelists with necessary expertise in the subject matter of the relevant
covered agreements.
Canada’s proposal involves replacement of the current indicative list by a panel
register.  The panel register will be prepared by asking each WTO member to nominate29
one individual for placement on a panel register.  While nominating an individual, each
Member will be required to provide a statement of qualifications of the nominee.  The
nominations will be scrutinized by a Committee, which will be the same as the Committee
for selection of Appellate Body Members, who will make sure that the nominations meet
the requisite level of expertise to serve as a panelist.  Canada’s proposal envisages that the
secretariat will propose potential panelists to the disputing parties drawing from the panel
roster.  The disputing  parties  will  be  able  to  propose  “off  roster”    candidates.   In  the
absence of an agreement between the disputing parties the DG will compose the panel
from the panel roster keeping in view the issues involved in the dispute.  If however, the
DG  determines  that  insufficient  expertise  is  available  from  the  roster  for  a  particular
dispute, the Director General will be able to appoint an individual other than from the
roster to serve as a panelist in that dispute.  Canada’s proposal envisages that Article 8.3 of
the DSU will be respected.
In my view EC’s proposal in its current form amounts to a leap into the unknown
We can perhaps have a combination of the present system and the system proposed by EC.
We can envisage a system along the following lines:
a) A roster of  Panel Chairpersons should be established by the DSB.  This roster
should be prepared and maintained with the approval of DSB on the basis of
recommendations from a Selection Committee constituted for this purpose by
the DSB.  The selection committee could perhaps be the same as the one which
selects Appellate Body Members.
b)  The parties to the disputes should arrive at a panel of three names or five names
within 20 days from the date of establishment of the panel.  The parties to the
dispute can consider the nominations proposed by the secretariat as provided
for in Article 8(6) of the DSU.  However, this should not preclude parties from
interacting  directly  without  the  involvement  of  the  secretariat  or  suggesting
names from the indicative list on their own for consideration by the other party.30
However, the parties cannot choose any name from the roster of  panel  Chair
persons.
c)  If there is no agreement between the parties (within 20 days) from the date of
establishment  of  the  panel,  the  parties  do  not  any  longer  have  a  right  to
establish  a  mutually  agreed  panel  and  the  responsibility  for  establishing  the
panel passes on to the DG (There should be no possibility for the parties to
extend  the  20  days  time  limit  even  on  the  basis  of  mutual  agreement.
Experience shows that the delay in constitution of panels is essentially due to
the parties dragging their feet and normally the respondent delays the process
especially if the   respondent happens to be a powerful developed country.  If
there is no mutual agreement within 20 days, the parties should have no further
say in the composition of the panel).
d)  When there is no mutual agreement between the parties within twenty days, the
DG can determine the panel as envisaged in Article 8(7) of the DSU with the
following stipulations:
i) The Chairman of the panel should be from the roster of panel chairpersons.
ii)  The selection of the Chairperson from the list of panel chairpersons should
be on the basis of a pre-determined formula that would eliminate scope for
discretion or manipulation.
iii) Other two or four members of the panel will be taken from the indicative
list.  While selecting two/four panelists from the indicative list, DG  should
give  preference  to  the  persons    in  respect  of  whom  there  might  be
agreement between the parties.
Even in the system suggested above, one can probably  pick many holes.  The
preparation of list of permanent panel chairpersons will face the same type of problems as31
envisaged in the preparation of list of permanent panelists.  In fact one could not even
argue  that  the  preparation  of  the  list  of  permanent  panel  chairpersons  will  be  more
problematic than the preparation of the list of permanent panelists.   However, we have to
remember that the EC’s proposals envisages that in future all panelists will be selected out
of the list of 15 to 24 of permanent panelists.  On the other hand the proposal above is that
the permanent list will be resorted to only if the parties to the dispute are not able to
mutually  settle  the  panel  composition  between  themselves.    Moreover,  the  list  will  be
utilized by the DG only for selecting, on a random basis, the chairperson. The other two
members  of  the  panel  will  be  taken  from  indicative  list.    As  things  stand  now,  the
indicative list has become meaningless.  Even when DG determines composition of the
panel he is not giving particular consideration to the large number of names available in
the indicative list.  The scheme envisaged above indicates that in a situation where DG
determines the composition of the panel because of the failure of the parties to agree on the
composition within the 20 days limit, he has to select the chairperson from the list of
permanent chairpersons and the other two or four members have to be picked up from the
indicative list.
The EU’s proposal in its current form virtually deletes Article 8(3).  It is better that
Article 8(3) continues to be respected.  This would mean that when the DG determines the
composition  of  the  panel  by  selecting  the  Chairperson  from  the  list  of  permanent
chairpersons and the members of the panel from the indicative list of panelists he has to
keep in mind Article 8 (3) of the DSU.  In the present stage in the evolution of the WTO
system one cannot think of abrogating Article 8(3) of the DSU.
It  is  no  doubt  true  that  while  composing  appellate  body  benches,  there  is  no
requirement of exclusion of an appellate body member from the bench because of his/her
nationality.  For one thing, one cannot equate the panel process and the appellate body
process.  In the case of panel process there is a specific provision in the form of Article
8(3) of the DSU while there is no such specific provision in respect of appellate body
process.  The agreed rules of procedures of the Appellate Body do not contain a provision
similar to Article 8(3) because32
a)  a similar provision would have prevented appellate body members belonging to
US  and  EU  from  sitting  on  benches  dealing  with  disputes  involving  these
countries.    This  would  have  resulted  in  a  situation  wherein  appellate  body
members from US and EU would have had much less work compared to other
members  thereby,  creating  considerable  problems  for  the  functioning  of  the
appellate body.
b)  The  rules  envisaged  that  the  appellate  body  will  function  on  the  basis  of
“collegiality”.  This meant that every appellate body member had the right to
offer his views in respect of every dispute.  Against this backdrop, nationality
of the member ceased to be a major issue.
In the system of permanent panelists proposed by EU or in the system of permanent
panel  chairpersons  envisaged  above,  because  of  the  large  number  involved  it  is  not
possible to follow the principle of collegiality.  Moreover, considering the large number of
panels being established in the WTO, it is unlikely that the panelists from one or two WTO
Members will be under worked.     This is particularly true in a situation where we are
going to have only a roster of permanent chairpersons and when this roster will be operated
only if the parties are not able to mutually agree on the composition of the panel within 20
days.  Hence, the continued relevance of article 8(3).
It is possible that EC may  argue that proposal above i.e. moving to permanent
panelists only when the parties do not agree and having only a list of permanent chair
persons rather than a list of permanent panelists changes the fundamental characteristics of
their proposal.  One can respond by saying that one is not comfortable with the thought of
drawing all future panelists from a limited list of 15 – 24 individuals. Apart from the
concerns already highlighted, there is another aspect, which should be kept in view.  Since
panelists are currently drawn from different backgrounds and from different countries there
is certain amount of awareness developing among academics, lawyers, and governments of
different  Members  about  panel  procedures.    This,  to  some  extent  is  enhancing  the33
credibility and acceptability of the system. The implication of the EU’s original proposal
was that all government officials would be virtually debarred because of their affiliation
with  their  national  governments.    However,  the  EU  has  modified  its  proposals
subsequently to say that government servants on temporary leave from their government
may serve as permanent panelists.   EU’s proposal is a bit vague about the full time nature
of academics and legal experts.  Presumably, they do not have to give up their current
professional  work/responsibilities  to  be  eligible  to  become  permanent  panelists.    By
continuing  to  respect  Article  8(3)  of  the  DSU  many  of  the  complications  which  are
inherent in the EU proposal could be avoided.  In my view national governments have
made a great contribution by agreeing that nationality of the members of the Appellate
Body  concerned  will  not  be  relevant  for  constituting  a  Appellate  Body  bench.    It  is
necessary for the WTO  system to show certain degree of sensitivity to the concerns and
problems  of national governments and ensure that Article 8(3) continues to be respected in
the composition of the panels.  The world has not evolved into a situation as yet in which
nationality of the panelists is not a sensitive issue.  EC may still argue that one of the
primary objectives of their proposal is to provide for a full time activity in order to ensure
panelists of high quality and expertise.  According to EC their proposal will ensure that
panels  will be able to handle procedural developments, such as preliminary rulings and the
handling of business confidential information as well as the increased complexity of the
assessment of facts in a better fashion.  Though not stated explicitly till now, EU at some
stage may also argue that their system will be able to handle the situation of compliance
panels better since the original  panelists being drawn from a list of full time permanent
panelists,  will  be  easily  available  to  perform  the  role  of  compliance  panel.  Similar
arguments will also be made in case Appellate Body gets powers to remand cases to the
original panel.
One has to concede that there are many advantages in drawing panelists from a list
of full time permanent panelists.  However, one cannot be blind to the fact  that a system
full time of permanent panelists will change the system more profoundly than generally
understood.  As pointed out by Professor Thomas Cottier, a system of permanent panelists
will affect the balance of power in the WTO.  The relationship of panels and the Secretariat34
will change to the extent panels develop own expertise and independence.  The combined
effect of permanent body of panelists and the appellate body will bring about an overall
legal  culture  into  the  organization,  reducing  a  sense  of  ownership  which  the  trade
diplomats currently have towards the system.  Therefore it is necessary to move towards
the system of permanent panelists gradually and cautiously.  Basically the EU’s proposal
would imply that all panelists will be drawn from a pool of 15-24 panelists except when
both the parties agree at the time of establishment of the panel that panels may include up
to two individuals from outside the roster with particular expertise on the subject matter of
the  dispute.    Even  in  that  exceptional  situation  the  Chairman  will  be  drawn  from  the
permanent roster only.  My suggestion implies that the parties to the dispute still retained
the  possibility  of  agreeing  on  the  panelists.    When  they  don’t,  the  DG  will  select  the
Chairman of the panel from a permanent list of Chair persons on a random basis and the
two panelists will be selected from the indicative list.  It is true in the system suggested by
me some of the advantageous of the system proposed by EU will not be there.  However,
the system suggested by me still provides for parties agreeing on a panel, which is very
good from the point of view of credibility and acceptability of the system.   In case the
parties cannot agree the system suggested by me is such that it will significantly reduce the
scope for discretion and manipulation in the composition of the panel. My own expectation
is that if the roster of permanent chair persons is prepared carefully with credible names,
over a period of time, a trend will emerge in which the parties to the dispute will prefer the
chair person to be drawn from the roster.  In my view EU proposal is too radical for the
current times.  The system will have to go through the following stages: a) a situation in
which there is still a possibility of parties to the dispute agreeing on panelists and in the
absence of such an agreement, DG choosing on a random basis the Chair person from a list
of full time permanent Chair persons and the other two panelists from the indicative list.
(b) a situation in which the Chair person is chosen on a random basis from a list of full
time permanent chair persons without any reference to the preference of the parties and for
the possibility of mutually agreeing on the names of two panelists and the DG nominating
two persons in case there is no agreement between the parties.  (c) a situation in which the
parties to the dispute will have no say in the composition of panel and the chairperson as
well  as  the  other  two  members  of  the  panel  will  be  drawn  from  a  permanent  list  of35
panelists on a random basis.  (This is virtually the current proposal of the EU though it has
provided  for  the  possibility  of  drawing  panelists  from  outside  the  list  if  the  expertise
required for dealing with a dispute is not available within the list).
It is clear that EU’s proposal  is not getting as much support as one would have
expected, considering the inherent merits of the proposal. This is because of the fact that
the system is not ready for such a radical change, in spite of the fact that, many delegations
are unhappy with the present system of ad hoc panelists. The proposals from Thailand and
Canada also indicate their preference for a gradual change.
As far as qualifications are concerned EC has said that permanent panelists should
have major demonstrated expertise in international trade laws, economy or policy, and/or
past experience as a GATT/WTO.  This formulation, besides being ambiguous, is more
restrictive than Article 8(1) of the DSU.  In case the idea of a list of permanent panelists or
the idea of a list of permanent panel chairpersons goes though, it has to be ensured that the
prescribed qualifications do not become different from what is envisaged in Article 8(1) of
the DSU.  This article does not prohibit non-lawyers from functioning as panelists.  This
provision does not also prohibit persons who have no previous experience of serving as
panelists from  being  appointed  as  panelists.    After  all,  those  who  claim  experience  as
panelists today, became panelists on the first occasion without any previous experience!
Any  stipulation  that  the  permanent  list  of  panelists  or  permanent  list  of  chair  persons
should include only those who had served as panelists earlier will be highly restrictive
besides being inequitable for the reasons referred to earlier.  Similarly, a stipulation that
only  lawyers  could  be  included  in  the  list  of  permanent  panelists  or  permanent  chair
persons will also be highly  restrictive.  Such a stipulation has not  been  made  even  in
respect of appellate body members and it will be extremely odd if such a restriction is
made in respect of permanent panelists or permanent chairpersons of panels.36
IV.2  The Amicus Curiae Submissions
On the subject of Amicus Curiae Submissions proposals have been made by the
European Communities (EC) the United States, the African Group, India and others as well
as Chinese Taipei.
The EC Proposal on the subject of regulation of Amicus Curiae Submissions starts
with the following sentence:
“The DSU as interpreted by the Appellate  Body now  allows the submission of
Amicus Curiae briefs on a case by case basis”.   This is an slightly misleading statement by
the EC.  The US proposal on the subject is worded very cleverly. The US  proposal states :
“In  light  of  experience  to-date,  with  Amicus  Curiae  Submissions  to    Panels  and  the
Appellate Body, Members may  wish to consider whether it will be helpful to propose
guideline procedures for handling Amicus Curiae Submissions to address those procedural
concerns that have been raised by Members, Panels and the Appellate Body”.  The US
proposal implies that panels and the Appellate Body have the right to entertain Amicus
curiae submissions and what is required is only guidelines to handle procedural concerns
expressed by Members.  Both EC and the US appear to be preceding on the basis as if
there is no serious problem about entertaining Amicus curiae submissions  and that what is
required is only laying down of procedures for handling Amicus curiae submissions.
The  approach  of  EC  and  US  to  the  subject  of  Amicus  curiae  submission  is  at
variance with the discussions which took place in the special session of the general council
held on 22
nd November, 2000.  After a detailed discussion of the communication from the
Appellate Body to the Chairman of the DSB contained in document WT/DS135/9, the
General Council, by consensus, requested the chairman of the General Council to convey
to  the  Appellate  Body  the  strong  feelings  of  the  Membership  about  Appellate  Body’s
approach  to  the  subject  of  Amicus  Curiae  Submissions  and  serious  concerns  of  the
membership about the action of the Appellate Body in outlining procedures for receipt and
consideration of Amicus Curiae briefs  when an overwhelming number of Members have37
repeatedly pointed out that  the Appellate Body has no authority to seek Amicus Curiae
briefs or accept unsolicited Amicus Curiae briefs.
The issue of Amicus Curiae briefs came into sharp focus first in the Shrimp Turtle
case.  The Panel in this case considered that is was not entitled to accept amicus curiae
briefs under Article 13 of the DSU and observed that accepting non-requested, information
from  non-governmental  sources  would  be,  in  their  opinion,  incompatible  with  the
provisions of the DSU as currently applied.  In that case, the Appellate Body over-ruled the
panel by saying that the panel’s reading of the word “seek” is unnecessarily formal and
technical in nature and said that a panel has discretionary authority either to accept and
consider or reject information and advice submitted to it, whether requested by a panel or
not.  When the relevant report came up for adoption, a large number of Members pointed
out that the Appellate Body, by giving a new interpretation to certain DSU provisions, had
overstepped  the  bounds  of  its  authority  by  undermining  the  balance  of  rights  and
obligations of Members.  In that meeting, the only delegation which defended the approach
of the Appellate Body was the United States.
Subsequently, in the Bismuth Carbon Steel case, the Appellate Body stated that
neither  the  DSU  nor  the  working  procedures  explicitly  prohibited  acceptance  or
consideration of such briefs. On the basis of this curious logic, the Appellate Body said
‘we are of the  opinion  that  we  have  the  legal  authority  under  the  DSU  to  accept  and
consider Amicus curiae briefs in an appeal in which we find it pertinent and useful to do
so”.  Again, when this report came up for adoption, a number of delegations expressed
serious concern regarding the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the treatment of Amicus
curiae briefs.  Many delegations also pointed out that the acceptance by the Appellate
Body of Amicus curiae briefs is not a procedural but a substantive matter and that the issue
cannot be dealt with under Rule 16(1).
In the Asbestos case the Appellate Body tried to introduce procedures for dealing
with Amicus curiae briefs on the alleged ground that these procedures are necessary to
discipline the process and allow the division hearing the appeal to manage in a fair, legal38
and orderly manner, a difficult, practical situation which the members of the Appellate
Body anticipated would arise in that appeal.  The action of the Appellate Body in issuing
so called additional procedures under Rule 16(1) of the working procedures for appellate
review created considerable amount of disquiet among WTO members.  Because of the
strong feelings of Members on the subject,  a special general council meeting was called on
22nd November, 2000 in  which  almost  every  Member  criticized  the  Appellate  Body’s
action in strong terms.  The most important thing is that when the Chairman summed up
the proceedings of the meeting  and said that he will convey informally strong feelings of
the membership to the Appellate Body, there was no disagreement  and thus there was
consensus.  Of  course,  the Chairman of the General Council in his summing up stated that
the membership will have to consider and come to a clear  decision on the subject of
Amicus Curiae briefs., if they want to avoid the  vacuum which the Appellate Body has
been trying to fill.
Subsequent to the general body meeting of  22
nd November, 2000  the Appellate
Body withdrew the additional procedure purported to have been issued  under Rule 16(1)
In the light of the above, there is no basis for the EC’s claim that the DSU as
interpreted by the Appellate Body now allows  submission of Amicus curiae briefs on a
case by case basis.
In the last few years, India, almost all other developing countries  as well as a good
number  of  developed  countries  have  been  voicing  their  strong  opposition  to  the
introduction  of  Amicus  curiae  briefs  in  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  system  on  the
following grounds:
1. acceptance of Amicus curiae briefs changes the inter-governmental nature of
the organization by providing space to non-governmental actors to influence
the process as well as outcome of the dispute settlement system
2.  acceptance of Amicus curiae briefs changes Members’ rights and obligations.
Acceptance  of  Amicus  curiae  briefs  would  necessarily  mean  their39
examination by parties to the dispute and responding to arguments contained
in the briefs.  This necessarily adds to the obligations and consequently to the
burden of the parties.
3.  Article  17.9  of  the  DSU  and  by  extension,  the  working  procedures  for
Appellate Review were not applicable to substantive issues
4.  acceptance of Amicus curiae briefs will mean additional financial resources
and also additional time.
5.  Most of the Amicus curiae briefs would be submitted by interest groups with
narrow focus.  This will come in the way of the dispute settlement system
balancing the interest of all stake holders
6.  The argument that consideration of Amicus curiae briefs would increase the
public support for the dispute settlement mechanism is not based on any clear
empirical evidence.  It is possible that in a system of dispute settlement where
Amicus curiae briefs are freely allowed and narrow interest groups hog the
limelight,  the common  man may feel that the system is not capable of taking
a balanced  view of various interests nor sub-serving larger public interest
7.  Acceptance of Amicus curiae briefs  would  result  in  a  curious  situation  in
which NGOs and other non-governmental actors will have better rights in the
matter of intervening in the Appellate Body Process.
The African group in their proposal has suggested that unsolicited information be
directed to the parties and not to the panel.  The group also proposed that in deciding
whether  to  seek  information,  panels  consult  the  parties  and  their  legal  advisors.  The
African group also proposes the reaffirmation of the use of the expert review groups under
Article 13.2 and Appendix 4 procedures.  It would appear that the thrust of the African
proposal is to  put some imitation on the ability of panels to seek information under Article
13 of the DSU.  In my view it may not be desirable to try to build in some restrictions on
the right to seek information under Article 13.
The Indian proposal has the effect of preventing panels and Appellate body from
considering unsolicited information.40
The main thrust of the proposal of Chinese Taipei, is that allowing consideration of
unsolicited Amicus curiae submissions, as proposed by EU, would create situation where
those Members with the least social resources could be put at a disadvantage.  In other
words, Chinese Taipei, is not is favour of considering unsolicited Amicus curiae briefs.
With  regard  to  the  US  proposal  to  create  some  guideline  procedures  for  handling  of
Amicus curiae submissions, to address Members’ concerns, Chinese Taipei questions the
need for this because it believes it is already adequately covered by precedence from past
cases for the panel and the Appellate Body to follow.  It is not clear as to whether Chinese
Taipei, have appreciated the fact that the Appellate Body has created a wrong precedent
enabling it to consider unsolicited Amicus curiae briefs.
A  large  number  of  developing  countries  as  well  as  some  developed  countries
continue to feel strongly against providing for the possibility of Amicus curiae submissions
in  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  process  Therefore,  countries  like  India  and  others  can
continue to voice their  opposition to the idea.  These Members of the WTO  must make it
abundantly clear to US and EC that an overwhelming number of members have strongly
expressed themselves against the attempt of Appellate Body to provide for receipt and/or
consideration of Amicus curiae briefs in gross violation of the provisions of the DSU and
that they cannot accept the premise that DSU as interpreted by Appellate Body provides
for Amicus curiae submissions and that what is to be done now by the membership is only
to evolve appropriate rules and guidelines for the  receipt and consideration of Amicus
curiae briefs.
The Appellate Body is to some extent influenced by political considerations rather
than legal considerations in interpreting DSU in such a way as to acquire power for itself
to receive and consider Amicus curiae submissions.  It is the general feeling of a large
number of WTO members that the Appellate Body is concerned that if the WTO Dispute
Settlement system does not provide for handling of Amicus curiae briefs, it will not gain
the required degree of acceptance in US and EU, two most powerful members of theWT0.
Therefore, the Appellate Body is persisting with its interpretation of DSU provisions and41
continues to claim that it has a right to receive Amicus curiae briefs, because there is no
prohibition against it in the DSU.  The proposals from India and the African group are
intended to prevent this types of interpretation of DSU by the Appellate Body.   If these
proposals go through it will be a happy situation.  However, it will be a miracle if EU and
US agree to the proposals made by India and the African group.  Thus, it is likely that there
will be a stalemate in the DSU negotiations with regard to Amicus Curiae briefs, because
of reluctance on the part of US and EC to accept any proposal, which would prevent panels
and appellate body from receiving and  considering  Amicus curiae briefs on the one hand
and the reluctance of other members to agree to any  proposal which would legitimize
receipt and consideration of Amicus curiae briefs by panels and appellate body.  If no deal
is finally arrived at with regard to Amicus curiae briefs, I am afraid that it will embolden
Appellate body further and the Appellate body will continue to do whatever it wants secure
in  the  belief  that  WTO  membership  will  not  be  able  to  build  a  consensus  against  the
Appellate Body’s interpretation in the relevant rules.  In this situation, countries like India
are really faced with a Hobson’s choice and they should try to make the best out of a bad
situation.
The EC’s proposal is drafted in such a way that panels as well as the Appellate
body are enabled to consider unsolicited Amicus curiae briefs subject to certain conditions.
The EC has proposed its new article as Article 13bis.  If we see the structure of the DSU as
well  as  the  language  of  article  13,  it  deals    only  with  the  right  of  a  Panel  to  seek
information.  In fact, in Articles 17, dealing with Appellate Review there is no power given
to the Appellate Body, to seek information as has been given to the Panels under Article
13.    In  fact,  many  delegations,  in  the  Special  General  Council  Meeting,  held  on  22
November 2000, pointed out that only the panels have been given the right to seek expert
opinion and argued that if at all a way has to be found for dealing with unsolicited Amicus
curiae briefs, it can be only done at  the panel stage and not at the Appellate Body stage.
There is also another powerful argument as to why Amicus curiae briefs should not be
entertained at the Appellate Body stage.  Article 17.6 of the DSU states that an appeal shall
be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed
by the panel.   According to Article 17.3 of the DSU the Appellate Body Members are42
expected to have a demonstrated expertise in law.  The Amicus curiae briefs are normally
about facts and assessments and not about legal issues.  In fact quite a few delegations
pointed  out  in  the  special  general  council  meeting  held  on  22  November,  2000,  that
persons having demonstrated expertise in law do not need assistance of Amicus curiae
briefs in dealing with issues of law.  Moreover, when Amicus curiae briefs are allowed
both at the panel and the Appellate Body stage, a curious result follows, in the sense that
Non-members  get  better  rights  than  Members.    This  anomaly  can  be  avoided  if
consideration of unsolicited Amicus curiae briefs is restricted to the Panel stage.  In view
of  all  these  considerations,  a  possible  compromise  is  to  provide  for  the  possibility  of
considering unsolicited Amicus curiae briefs, subject to certain conditions, at the panel
stage and not at the Appellate body stage
EC  proposal  relating  to  Amicus  curiae  submission  contained  in  Article  13bis
closely  follows  the  elements  procedure  outlined  by  the  Appellate  Body  in  document
WT/DS135/9.  The proposal contains a two-stage approach namely an application for leave
and  an  effective  submission.  In  response  to  India’s  questions    EC  has  given  certain
clarifications regarding that proposal.  These clarifications are in the desirable direction,
especially EC assertion that the panel/appellate body will not address new claims, if any
raised in the Amicus curiae briefs, though they may address new arguments.  It is difficult
procedure suggested by EC for dealing with Amicus curiae submissions.  What we have to
insist is that unsolicited Amicus curiae briefs can be considered only at the Panel stage,
and that there should be an accompanying decision, which will prevent the Appellate Body
from  misinterpreting  the  DSU  and  considering  unsolicited  Amicus  curiae  briefs  at  the
Appellate Stage.
Assuming that there is an agreement to limit consideration of Amicus curiae briefs
to the panel stage and that the procedures suggested by EC for consideration of Amicus
curiae briefs are accepted, four things have to be ensured.
1.  It should be explicitly stated that NGOs or organizations submitting Amicus
curiae briefs  will  not  be  entitled  to  any  personal  hearing,  that  there  is  no43
obligation  on  the  part  of  the  panel  to  deal  with  all  the  claims/arguments
contained in Amicus curiae submissions.  (EC’s proposal covers the second
element but does not cover the first element explicitly).
2.  A decision of the panel to allow or disallow submission of Amicus curiae
brief by any particular applicant shall not be a subject matter of appeal.
3.  It must be categorically stated that agreement for the possibility of Amicus
curiae submissions at the panel stage in the WTO system is given purely as an
experimental measure.  The changes introduced in the DSU with a view to
provide for Amicus curiae submissions will automatically lapse after three
years unless there is a consensus to extend the period of validity of these
provisions.  To some extent the WTO system  is  getting  into  an  unknown
situation by providing for Amicus curiae briefs at the panel stage in the WTO
dispute settlement system.  If experience shows that developing countries’
interests are seriously  affected because of the introduction of Amicus curiae
briefs, they should be able to go back to status quo ante.
4.  Concurrence for a provision in the DSU relating to Amicus curiae submission
at the Panel stage, should not be given easily by developing countries  and if
given ultimately should fetch for them something in return.  It is generally
believed  that US has enormous interest in providing for Amicus curiae briefs.
EC’s  interest  is  also  enormous,  though  EC’s  interest  may  not  be  as
predominant  as  that  of  US.    If  countries  like  India    ultimately  agree  for
Amicus curiae submission at the panel stage, they  should get at least the
following two in return.
a)  A  clear  amendment  for  the  DSU  providing  for  multilateral
determination  of  compliance  or  non-compliance  before  retaliation
could take place (i.e. sequencing issue)44
b)  Through  a  clear  amendment,  we  should  make  it  impossible  for
anybody to resort to carousel unilaterally.
In fact EC will have no problem with these two elements.  In fact, EC has given a
detailed proposal in order to ensure sequencing between Article 21.5 and Article 22.6.  As
regards carousel, Thailand and Philippines have given a detailed proposal making carousel
illegal and EC has said that it can support this proposal.
IV.3  Third Parties
During the course of the implementation of the DSU, the subject of the rights of
third parties has come to the forefront.  According to the existing provisions of the DSU,
whenever, a Member other than the Consulting Members (that is a Third party), considers
that it has a substantial trade interest in the consultations being held, such Member may
notify the consulting Members and the DSB within a prescribed time limit, of its desire to
be joined in the Consultations.  Such Member shall be joined in the consultations, provided
that the Member to which the request for consultations was addressed agrees that the claim
of substantial interests is justified.  On a number of occasions a Member’s request to be
joined in the consultations has been refused on the ground that the Member concerned does
not have substantial trade interests in the consultations being held.  Thus one problem area
is the use of two different phrases, namely” substantial trade interest” and “substantial
interest” in the same article namely, Article 4.11 of the DSU.
In terms of Article 10.2 of the DSU, any Member (i.e. a Third Party) having a
substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB
shall have an opportunity to be heard by the Panel and to make written submissions to the
Panel.
According  to  Article  10.3    of  the  DSU,  the  Third  Parties  shall  receive  the
submissions of the parties to the dispute in the first meeting of the panel.  On the basis of
this provision, third parties are being allowed to participate in the first meeting of the panel45
and not in the subsequent meetings.  Again, third parties only receive the first submission
to the panel and not subsequent submissions.
Again, in terms of Article 17.4 of the DSU only those Members who are third
parties before the panel can make written submissions to and be given an opportunity to be
heard by the Appellate Body.
A number of proposals have been made regarding third party rights.  Most of these
proposals   are designed to enhance the third party rights in the dispute settlement process.
However, Chinese Taipei, has sounded a note of caution, and stated that third party rights
should be kept within reasonable limits.
As regards, conditions to be joined in consultations there are proposals from Costa
Rica, Jamaica and Chinese Taipei.  Costa Rica’s suggestion is that whenever a third party
considers that it has a substantial interest in consultations being held, such Member shall
be joined in the consultations as long as the request is made within the prescribed time
limit.   Jamaica  has  suggested  that  guidelines  should  be  developed  to  prevent  arbitrary
refusal of third party requests for consultation.  Chinese Taipei is not in favour of Costa
Rica’s  proposal  and  feels  that  “substantial  trade  interests”  should  continue  to  be  the
requirement for third party participation.
I am of the view that Costa Rican proposal deserves support.  Experience shows
that some major delegations arbitrarily refuse the request for joining in the consultations.
The  suggestion  of  Jamaica  and  Chinese  Taipei  that  we  should  develop  guidelines  to
prevent arbitrary refusal of Third Party requests for joining in the consultations is not very
realistic  in  as  much  as  it  is  very  difficult  to  arrive  at  a  consensus  based  definition  of
substantial trade interest.  There does not appear to be any basis for the fear expressed by
Chinese Taipei that if the rules relating to Third Parties joining in the consultations are
relaxed, the sanctity of the consultation process will be adversely affected.  Even under the
existing  provision  of  Article  4.11  of  the  DSU,    if  a  party’s  request  for  joining  in  the
consultations is refused, that party can seek direct consultations, which cannot be refused.46
Experience shows that Members request to be joined in the consultations only when they
have a genuine interest.  Many small and poor developing countries feel that by joining in
the consultations they can have a clear idea as to whether a particular dispute will have
implications for their own interests.  Costa Rica’s proposal is straight forward and deserves
to be supported thereby enabling Members to join in the consultations, whenever they so
desire, without the fear of any obstruction.  By providing for an easy process to join in the
consultations, developing countries, can be helped to avoid the necessity of seeking direct
consultations  just    to  know  whether  their  interests  are  involved  or  not  in  a  particular
dispute.
There  are  also  proposals  from  European  communities,  Costa  Rice  and  Chinese
Taipei with regard to dead line for expressing third party interest.  Article 10.2  of the DSU
as it stands now does not impose any time limit for notifying third party interest of the
DSB.  EC has proposed addition of phrase “Within Ten Days”. Costa Rica has made a
clearer proposal by saying that the Third  Party interests should be notified within ten days
after the date of the establishment of the panel.  Chinese Taipei supports the Costa Rican
proposal.
Costa Rican proposal can be supported in as much as it only formalizes the current
practice.
There are a number of proposals providing for enhanced the Third Party rights at
the  panel  stage.    EC’s  proposal  is  that  Third  Parties  should  receive  all  documents  or
information  submitted  to  the  Panel  except  certain  factual  confidential  information  and
except for any submission made following the interim panel report.  EU has also proposed
a Third Party may observe any of the substantive meetings of the panel with the parties
except for portions of sessions where factual confidential information is discussed.  Japan’s
proposal is identical to the proposal given by EU.   Costa Rica has suggested the Third
Parties shall receive a copy of all documents or information submitted to the panel.  It has
also suggested that third parties should have the opportunity to be present at all stages of
proceedings.    The  African  proposal  is  similar  to  the  proposal  of  Costa  Rica.    While47
agreeing with the Costa Rican proposal, Chinese Taipei has suggested that participation of
third parties in the dispute should not be allowed to increase the complexity of the dispute.
Jamaica has suggested that the panels should consider the submissions of enhanced third
party participation even if the parties did not make similar submissions to the proceedings.
However, Chinese Taipei has argued that in the interest of judicial economy the panel and
appellate body should not be bound to take into consideration, the views and arguments
presented by  a third party, but should need only  address those claims relevant to the
solving the matter at issue in the dispute.
Costa  Rica  has  also  proposed  that  the  Third  parties  should  have  the  right  to
comment on the descriptive portion as well as the interim report.  It has also proposed that
third parties should have the right to receive the comments of parties on the descriptive
part as well as responses to the questions put by the panel.
While certain amount of enhanced status for third parties in the dispute settlement
process is desirable, the effect of the Costa Rican proposal is to virtually treat third parties
on  par  with  parties  to  the  dispute.    Such  a  situation  is  not  desirable  in  and  only  the
following elements need favorable consideration:
a)  A  right  to  join  in  the  consultation  when  any  Member  feels  that  it  has  a
substantial interest. (not necessarily substantial trade interests).
b)  Entitlement to receive all information and documents
c)  Presence at all substantive meetings of the panel.
However, third parties need not be given the right to comment on the descriptive
part or the interim report   nor should there be a stipulation that all arguments of third
parties should be discussed by the panel reports.  The proposal that Third Parties should
receive  the  final  report  at  the  same  time  as  the  parties  does  not  appear  to  be  very
reasonable.48
As things stand now, Members who have not notified their third party interests at
the panel stage cannot become third parties at the appellate stage.  This stipulation has
created some difficulties for some Members in certain  situations.      Some  times,  panel
reports come out with some findings or observations, which could not have been even
remotely anticipated at the time the panel was being constituted.  In the light of this some
Members might want to become Third Parties at the appellate stage.  Such a possibility is
not provided for in Article 17.4 and this situation has to be remedied.  As regards, the
Appellate stage is concerned there are proposals from Costa Rica as well as India and
others suggesting that Article 17.4 of the DSU be modified along the lines of Article 10.2
of the DSU.  In other words, Members who are not third parties, at the panel stage should
have a possibility of becoming third parties at the appellate stage if they so desire.  The
amendment suggested by Costa Rica to Article 17.4   is appropriate and deserves to be
supported.
India has also pointed out how the Appellate Body is interpreting Article 17.4 in
such a way as though it is a discretion of the Appellate Body to give an opportunity to a
Third Party to make an oral presentation and that a Third Party which has not made a
written submission has no right to make an oral presentation.  The Indian proposal tries to
rectify the situation by giving the right to Third Parties to make an oral presentation before
the Appellate Body.  This is a good proposal and deserves to be pursued vigorously.
IV.4  Panel Working Procedures
There  are  a  number  of  proposals  relating  to  Panel  Working  Procedures.    The
subject of Third Parties has been dealt with separately.  In this section, only two of the
proposals relating to Panel Procedures are discussed because of their far-reaching nature.
Input provided by the Secretariat:
On this subject there are proposals by the LDC group as well as a joint proposal by
India and a number of developing countries.  The LDC group has suggested that assistance
provided to the panel, particularly the legal research undertaken by the Secretariat and49
other commentary prepared in the course of and for use in the case, should be provided to
the parties.  The LDC group has pointed out this will enable the parties to the dispute to
appreciate better the decisions of the panels.  The LDC group also feels that their proposal
is part of the quest for openness and transparency of the dispute settlement system. India
and others have suggested an amendment to para 10 of Appendix 3 dealing with working
procedures.  Their suggestion is to add the following sentence to para 10 of Appendix 3.
“Any document, notes, information, etc., submitted by the Secretariat to the panel shall
be given promptly to the parties to the dispute, whose views on such documents, notes,
information, etc., shall be taken into consideration by the panel”.
The proposals made by the LDC group as well as India and others amount to the
same thing in substance namely, due process as well as transparency vis-à-vis the parties.
One can conceptually argue that transparency has to be provided at three different
levels.
a)  Transparency from the point of view of Members participating in the dispute
(whether as parties or third parties),
b)  Transparency from the point of view of non-participating Members and
c)  transparency from the point of view of the general public.
Under the present system the Secretariat gives lot of input to the panel but the
parties to the dispute are unaware of the secretariat input.  In the India patent case, the
panel  report  alluded  to  the  negotiating  history  of  Article  70.8  and  70.9  of  the  TRIPS
Agreement.    Obviously,  it  was  the  secretariat  input,  but  the  panel  never  gave  an
opportunity to India to comment on the secretariat input.  (In fact in its DSB statement at
the time of adoption of the report, India regretted this situation).  It is informally learnt that
in disputes involving EC and US, during the initial meetings of the panel convened for the
purpose of determining panel procedures, US violently objected to any idea of secretariat
input being made available to the parties, though reportedly EC was in favour of such an
approach.    It  could  be  argued  by  some  that  if  a  procedural  requirement  is  imposed50
providing access to the parties to the material provided by the secretariat, the panel may get
the material from the secretariat informally and that no purpose will be achieved.  The
could, no doubt, happen. But when three panel Members are involved it cannot happen
very easily.  Even if that happens the panel cannot make explicit use of the material in its
report.  Due process requirement will be met only if the parties have access to all the
material available to the panel.
During the DSU Review EC has made a suggestion that before each hearing the
parties to the dispute should have access to the file before the panel and the Appellate
Body.    This  file  should  include  not  only  the  submissions  but  also  any  analysis  and
background information provided by the WTO secretariat and the legal secretariat of the
Appellate Body.  EC does not seem to have included this item in its proposal for DSU
negotiations.
It  is  good  that  LDC  group  as  well  as  a  number  of  developing  countries  have
suggested that the secretariat input to the Panel should be made available to the parties to
the  dispute.    There  will  be  significant  opposition  to  the  proposal  from  some  quarters.
However, this should not deter any country, which has made this proposal.  Of the three
types of transparencies alluded to earlier, US always emphasizes only transparency to the
public.  But the other two types of transparency are even more important.  However, US
does not appear to lay emphasis on transparency from the point of view of parties to the
dispute or third parties.  In fact, US has made a proposal that meetings of the panels and
the Appellate Body should be thrown open to the public.  It should be possible to point out
to  the  US  the  dichotomy  in  their  approach  to  the  subject  of  transparency  of  panel
procedures and highlight the importance of the other two types of transparency.
Opening of Panel Meetings to the Public
The EC has suggested the following addition to para 2 of Appendix 3, Working
Procedures.   “However, the parties may agree within 10 days from the date of51
establishment of the panel that the panel hearing shall be open to the public in
whole or in part”.
The US has proposed that the DSU should provide that the public may observe all
substantive  panel,  Appellate  Body,  and  Arbitration  meetings  with  the  parties,
except those portions, dealing with confidential information.
The African group does not consider it appropriate at this point in time for the
dispute settlement process to be open to the public.  According to the group the
implications of such a course of action for business and WTO Members and the
utility of such a course of action for the public in developing country Members,
will have to be examined carefully before any decision is taken.  Chinese Taipei
have expressed serious reservation about opening up the dispute settlement process
to the general public.  According to them,  this will undermine the government to
government process of dispute settlement.
Both EC and US have suggested that the precise modalities of opening panel and
Appellate Body proceedings to the public would have to be decided by the DSB.
Both EC and US in their submissions have referred to the practice in fora like the
International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and
pointed out that these fora are open to the public.  In response, it can be  pointed
out that  these  fora  do  not  entertain  amicus  curiae  submissions  (this  can be  got
double checked)  and  a point made   that  there  cannot  be  selective  adoption  of
practices in other fora.
It can be also legitimately pointed out that WTO dispute settlement system deals
with  significant  trade  interests  of    powerful  business  entities  and  that  even  the
silence presence of media, NGOs and business interest groups could put some sort
of psychological pressure on the panelists and the Appellate Body Members.52
It must however be appreciated that it is going to be very difficult to obtain support
for any  position which might be perceived to be negative.  I recall that when the
transparency  issue  was  being  discussed  in  the  context  of  Amicus  curiae  briefs,
some delegations including some developing country delegation argued that they
are not against silent presence of NGOs and others in the panel proceedings and the
Appellate Body proceedings and what they are against is “participation”.  In  fact
these delegations viewed Amicus curiae briefs as amounting to participation.
The situation is that if some delegations strongly  Amicus curiae briefs and succeed
in mustering sufficient support for that position, they are likely to be told that at a
minimum they should permit silent presence of NGOs and others in the dispute
settlement  proceedings.    If  the  proposal  relating  to  Amicus  curiae  briefs  goes
through  in some form or other, there may be an argument that if Members can go
as far as accepting  Amicus curiae briefs, why cannot they  agree to throw open the
dispute settlement proceedings to the public.
There should be clarity on one thing.  The EC proposal, perhaps in anticipation of
difficulties  in  obtaining  consensus  for  throwing  open  dispute  settlement
proceedings for the public, suggests that parties can decide whether the proceedings
should be thrown open to the public.  We should be opposition to the efforts to
introduce changes to the DSU by suggesting certain aspects can be decided by the
parties concerned.  Once in one dispute the proceedings are thrown open to the
public,  it  will  be  impossible  for  parties  in  another  dispute  to  say  that  the
proceedings will be thrown open to the public.  EC and US will always project
themselves  as  champions  of  transparency  and  hint  that  countries  like  India  are
opposing transparency.  Right at the initial stages of negotiation, it should be made
clear that every amendment to the DSU, whether explicit or implicit, has to be done
through  consensus  and  no  situation  could  be  left  to  the  parties  to  a  dispute  to
decide, if such a decision is going to have implications for other Members of the
WTO and future disputes.  In fact, India had serious concerns about the move of53
one delegation to telecast its trade policy review since it was rightly felt that it will
be impossible for other delegations to resist pressures to follow suit.
In the past whenever the subject of throwing open dispute settlement proceedings
to  the  general  public  was  raised,  India’s  position  was  that  dispute  settlement
proceedings  constitute  the  last  phase,  whereas  negotiations  and  review  of
implementation of agreements normally come before dispute settlement. We have
been hinting that before we decide to throw open dispute settlement proceedings to
the general public we should throw open the meetings of other WTO bodies like
general council, goods council, TRIPS council etc., to the general public.
It may not be a bad idea to throw open meetings of all WTO bodies to the public,
media etc.  Currently, what gets publicity in the press are the statements of EC and
US and the press briefings by the WTO secretariat.  Unfortunately, International
media do not get to know quickly enough what developing countries stated in a
meeting  since  developing  countries  are  not  able  to  devote  adequate  resources,
human  and  financial,  towards  media  relations  and  media  management.    WTO
secretariat,  consciously  or  unconsciously    bias,    gives  importance  to  developed
countries views rather than developing countries’ views.  This distorted situation
can be corrected if the media is allowed to be present in the meetings.
We can legitimately argue that in order to enhance the acceptability and
capability of WTO we should first throw open meetings of regular WTO bodies
like general council etc., to the public and that opening up the dispute settlement
proceedings should come at a later stage.  We can also point out that the panel and
Appellate  Body  proceedings  are  highly  legalistic  and  the  general  public  cannot
make out anything even if they are present in the dispute settlement proceedings
and that the general public is more likely to be interested in the meetings of WTO
bodies other than panels and the Appellate Body.54
The motivation behind the proposal by EC and US appears to be  more tactical
rather than any serious interest in real external transparency. Always their proposals
are  confined  to  opening  up  panel  and  Appellate  Body  proceedings.    They  are
making  it  appear  as  though  developing  countries  like  India  are  opposing  their
proposals for greater transparency.  It is time now for India and other developing
countries to change their  strategy.  In my view, India should propose that meetings
of all WTO bodies should be thrown open to the public and transparency issue
from the point of view of the general public is not limited to dispute settlement
proceedings alone.  This can result in two things; either the whole proposal gets
bogged down  or all the WTO bodies meetings are thrown open to the public.
It is necessary for India to explain its new  approach to other developing countries
and try to muster support.  Greater transparency in the WTO will be in the long
term interests of countries like India.  Greater transparency is likely to reduce the
influence of the Secretariat over the process and also reduce the scope for behind
the scene influence of major delegates.
Any  decision  to  open  up  meetings  of  WTO  bodies  and/or  dispute  settlement
proceedings to the general public can be a time limited decision, say for three years,
and there could be a provision that extension of this period will require consensus.
Members can in actual practice see how the new situation plays out and retain the
ability to reverse the decision to open the proceedings to the general public, if it is
considered necessary and desirable.
IV.5  Mutually agreed Solutions
Article 3.5 and 3.6 of the DSU read as follows:
“All  solutions  to  matters  formally  raised  under  the  consultation  and  dispute
settlement provisions of the covered agreements,  including  arbitration  awards,  shall  be
consistent with those agreements and shall  not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any55
Member  under  those  agreements,  nor  impede  the  attainment  of  any  objective  of  those
agreements.”
“Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and
dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB and
the relevant Councils and Committees, where any Member may raise any point relating
thereto”.
There are proposals from India and others as well as Japan on this subject because
of the fact that many delegations do not notify the mutually agreed solutions and even if
they  do,  not  in  great  detail  as  to  enable  other  delegations  to  judge  as  to  whether  the
mutually agreed solution is consistent with covered agreements.       EC and US avoided
notifying their mutually agreement on rules of origin for a long time though this agreement
had  adverse  impact  on  India’s  exports.    The  main  thrust  of  both  the  proposals is  that
mutually  agreed  solutions  should  be  notified  within  sixty  days  from  the  date  of  such
agreement.  The other element of the two proposals is that the notification should contain
sufficient details.  But the real problem is that even after the proposed amendment things
may not improve unless there is a consequence for non-notification.  It may be appropriate
to propose, in addition to what is already on the table, that failure to comply with this
obligation should have the effect of disabling the parties from invoking dispute settlement
procedures in respect of that matter.  Hopefully such a stipulation will ensure that mutually
agreed solutions will get notified and also get notified in time i.e. within the proposed time
limit of 60 days.
IV.6  Appellate Body and Appellate Review
A  number  of  proposals  have  been  made  with  regard  to  Appellate  Body  and
Appellate Review. Two of these more important proposals relate to the total number of
Appellate Body Members and term of the Appellate Body Members.  European Union has
suggested  an  amendment  to  Article  17.1,  which  would  state  that  the  total  number  of
Appellate Body Members may be modified from time to time by the General Council.
Thailand has submitted a proposal suggesting an amendment to paragraph 1 of Article17 of56
the DSU with a view to increasing the number of the Appellate Body Members.  Japan has
also suggested an amendment to article 17.1 so that the number of the Appellate Body
Members  could  be  modified  as  required  by  the  decision  of  the  DSB  or  the  General
Council.  Japan has also proposed that at the same time a process should be established for
considering  adequacy  of  the  number  and  making  recommendations  to  the  DSB  or  the
General Council on its modification, taking account of all related factors such as work
loads and implications on the budget.
There  does  not  appear  to  be  any  need  for  amending  Article  17.1  at  this  stage.
During the last three or four years the membership had occasion to look into this subject.
At no point of time a strong case was made for increasing the number of Appellate Body
members.  In fact there was a period in the early part of the year 2001, when Appellate
Body did not have a single case before it.   It is the general expectation that there may not
be any undue increase in the workload of the Appellate Body in the foreseeable future.
During the currency of this debate, some Appellate Body members have been suggesting
that there should be made “full time” so that they can enjoy facilities like pension, etc.  The
most important point to be borne in mind is that increase in the number of Appellate Body
members will inevitably mean increased budgetary allocation to the Appellate Body and
therefore, one has to look into this very, very carefully.  A permanent increase in the
number  of  Appellate  Body  members  can  be  justified  only  on  the  basis  of  sustained
increased workload on a long time basis.  There is another aspect, which should be borne
in  mind.    Sometimes  the  motivation  behind  the  proposal  to  increase  the  number  of
Appellate Body members is to get one’s own national as an Appellate Body member.  If at
any future point of time, the membership is convinced that there is need to increase the
number of Appellate Body members, they can do so by amending Article 17.1 at that point
of time.  There is no need to make an enabling amendment at this point of time.  It should
be borne in mind that any amendment to the DSU can be done only by consensus and
voting is not possible.   If an amendment is made now to Article 17.1 stating that the
General council can increase the number of Appellate Body members then the increase can
be effected through voting, legally speaking.  Any amendment to Article 17.1 providing
for the possibility of  increasing the Appellate Body members will immediately generate57
pressures to increase the Appellate Body members on the basis that by amending Article
17.1 the Membership have  impliedly accepted the case for increase in the number of
Appellate Body members.  There is another risk.  If we build into the DSU  a provision for
possible increase in the Appellate Body members what is likely to happen in future is that
whenever  the  selection  process  for  selecting  Appellate  Body  members  gets  tough,  the
selection  committee  may  choose  the  easy  option  of  recommending  an  increase  in  the
Appellate  Body  members.    This  is  by  no  means  a  far-fetched  thought.    At  least  one
powerful  delegation  informally  floated  the  idea  of  increasing  the  number  of  Appellate
Body members in order to get its candidates in, after realizing that its candidate is not
likely to make it in the normal selection process.  One  cannot also ignore the fact that the
number DDGs and even senior position in the Secretariat had increased, unrelated to actual
requirement or justification just to accommodate competing claims.  It will be sad, if the
Appellate Body also get into a similar situation.
Therefore,    no  proposal  for  amending  Article  17.1  of  the  DSU  with  a  view  to
increase the number of Appellate Body members either immediately or with a view to
provide for the possibility increasing the number of Appellate Body members in future
should be supported.
Regarding the term of the Appellate Body members there is a proposal by India and
others.  According to the present system the term of Appellate Body members is four years
and they can get extension for a second term of four years provided there is consensus in
the DSB.  This situation is not in keeping with the dignity of the Appellate Body members
nor is it conducive for independence for the Appellate Body members.  At the end of the
four year term, the Appellate Body members have to depend on the same membership
whose  disputes  they  adjudicate  for  their  extension.    The  fact  that  no  Appellate  Body
member has been denied extension for a second term so far should not make one overlook
the real risks to the system in the present situation.  One cannot completely rule out the
possibility of powerful delegations withholding consensus for the extension of a particular
Appellate Body member just because they do not like the member concerned.  Therefore,
there is very good justification for the proposal submitted by India and others that the58
Appellate Body members should be eligible for a non-renewable single term of six years.
The proposal by India and others is based on very rational consideration and it is a good
proposal.  However, if the proposal meets with any resistance  India and others should
simply say that they are not pursuing the proposal.  In other words, what I am suggesting is
that India and others should not pay a price for getting acceptance of such an eminently
reasonable proposal.
India and others have suggested that Appellate Body should develop guidelines as
to what information should be contained in the notice of appeal.  Obviously this proposal
has been made in the light of the fact that some notices of appeal have been extremely
vague and brief thereby making it impossible for the respondent to get a good idea about
the nature of the appeal from the notice of appeal.  The jurisprudence developed by the
Appellate Body regarding the nature and scope of details to be included in the notice of
appeal has  also  not  been  very  clear.    Therefore,  the  proposal  that  the  Appellate  Body
should develop guidelines as to the details to be included in the notice of appeal is a good
proposal. which deserves to be supported.
IV.7  Examination of Remand Authority for the Appellate Body:
EC has proposed that DSU must contain a clear remand authority for the Appellate
body.  It is true that when a panel fails to examine all the relevant facts carefully the
Appellate body gets into some difficulty since the Appellate Body’s role is limited to legal
findings and legal interpretations developed by the panel.  The proposal of EC is simple
and straightforward.  However, remand authority for the Appellate Body is not likely to be
an unmixed blessing.  When a case is remanded to the panel, to that extent there will be
delay.  It is necessary that when the Appellate Body remands a case to the original panel or
the  compliance  panel,  the  panel  concerned  should  know  clearly  as  to  why  the  matter
concerned has been remanded to it and what is expected of.  The language proposed by EC
states “with the necessary findings of law and/or directions so as to enable the panel to
perform  its  task”.    One  can  consider  this  adequate  direction/indication  to  the
panel/compliance panel.  However, ECs proposal does not appear to be clear about the
time frame.  The EC proposal says that when the Appellate Body makes a remand, the59
DSB shall establish the panel within ten days after the request has been forwarded to the
Chair of the DSB.  It is not clear how a DSB meeting could be convened giving ten days
notice in such a way that DSB establishes the panel within ten days.  However, this is a
minor matter, which can be adjusted. Perhaps, there will be no need to convene a DSB
meeting for this purpose and the task can be left to the Chairman of the DSB with this
stipulation that he will inform the DSB about the action taken by him.  EC’s proposal does
not specify any time frame for disposal of the remanded matter by the original panel.
Perhaps the idea is that the Appellate Body, while remanding   the matter should indicate
the time frame.  Perhaps, the element of direction regarding time limit can be built into EC
language.   But more importantly, I would like an additional stipulation in the language
suggested by EC that the same case cannot be remanded more than once will be desirable.
During the negotiations, the risks involved providing for remand authority to the Appellate
Body should be kept in view.  This authority should not be allowed to be used in such a
manner as to manipulate the constitution of Appellate Body benches.  Methodologies have
to be found to ensure that this does not happen.  It is also possible that the Appellate Body
may  be  tempted  to  use  their  remand  authority  to  gain  some  extra  time  in  respect  of
politically difficult/sensitive cases.  Nothing can be done in this area through rules and it
should be left to the good sense and wisdom of the Appellate body.
IV.8  Compensation
The  objective  of  any  dispute  raised  by  a  Complainant  is  to  ensure  that  the
Respondent brings the offending measure into conformity with covered agreements either
by withdrawing the measure or by appropriately modifying the measure.  Article 19 of the
DSU states: “where a Panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent
with  a  covered  agreement,  it  shall  recommend  that  the  Member  concerned  bring  the
measure into conformity with that agreement.
Article 22.1 of the DSU reads as follows:
Compensation  and  the  suspension  of  concessions  or  other  obligations  are
temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not60
implemented within a reasonable period of time.  However, neither compensation nor the
suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a
recommendation  to  bring  a  measure  into  conformity  with  the  covered  agreements.
Compensation  is  voluntary  and,  if  granted,  shall  be  consistent  with  the  covered
agreements.
Soon after coming into force of WTO on 1.1.1995, many academics as well as
trade experts felt that the power to retaliate by withdrawal of concessions available to a
prevailing  party  in  a  dispute  will  ensure  prompt  implementation  of  the  rulings  and
recommendations of the DSB by the losing party.  However, experience shows that this is
not the case.  Of late, there is certain amount of disenchantment with the power to retaliate
by way of withdrawal of concessions or other obligations in as much as retaliation has its
own costs for the retaliating country.  The problem is particularly acute if a developing
country has to retaliate against a developed country.  Experience has also shown that in as
much as DSU provides only for an extremely limited period of 20 days, after the expiry of
reasonable period of time, to work out a mutually acceptable compensation package, the
prevailing party is, willy-nilly, forced to resort to retaliation.  There is a feeling in some
quarters, that compensation is a better route, compared to retaliation since compensation
has to be provided on an MFN basis while retaliation is specifically directed against the
losing party.  However, in practice it has been seen that since a compensation package has
to be mutually agreed between the complaining and the defending party the complaining
party is likely to demand compensation in those products in which it has a competitive
edge compared to other suppliers.  Thus, in the compensation route observance of MFN is
likely to be more in letter than in spirit.
Most of the proposals on the table relating to compensation are designed to make
the compensation route easier.  In my view, the compensation route is not an unmixed
blessing.    Once  the  compensation  route  becomes  more  easily  accessible  and  generally
acceptable thee would be less interest in bringing the measure into conformity with the
relevant  WTO  agreement.    This  has  happened  in  the  Beef  Hormone  case  where  EC
preferred  the  compensation  route  and  is  not  even  making  an  attempt  to  remove  the61
offending measure. There may be another risk involved in making the compensation route
easier  and  more  popular.    Weak  developing  countries  may  be  forced  to  accept
compensation packages, which may not really mean much.  As pointed out earlier, the
expectation that compensation would be available on MFN basis, has not been borne out in
practice.
Against this backdrop, let us look at the proposals on the table.  Australia, Japan,
EC, Ecuador, African group, LDC group, and Jamaica have given proposals on the subject
of compensation.
The Australian proposal suggests a DSB decision stating that (a) Members will
fully observe the requirement in Article 3.7 of the DSU that the provision of compensation
is a temporary measure pending withdrawal of the measure found to be WTO inconsistent.
(b) Members will not enter into compensation arrangements which amount to waiver of
their  obligations;  (c)  Member  should  ensure  that  compensation  is  consistent  with  the
covered agreements.   The  Australian proposal also states that compensatory measures
should  be  such  that  they  are  available  to  all  WTO  Members.    It  also  states  that  in
circumstances where it is not practical to apply compensatory measures that are generally
available, a non-implementing Member will, on request, agree to expedited  arbitration
under Article 25 of the DSU that would determine the right of a third party to negotiate
compensation  as  well  as  the  level  of  that  compensation.    The  critical  element  in  the
Australian proposal is that in case the compensation measure is not available on an MFN
basis,  the  aggrieved  Members  should  be  able  to  seek  arbitration  and    get  appropriate
compensation.  It would appear that the Australian proposal is significantly influenced by
the  tendency  of  US  and  EC  to  work  out  compensation  packages  which  are  mutually
satisfactory, but which adversely affect the interests of other WTO Members.
The other proposals on the able, are basically proposals suggesting procedures for
taking recourse to the compensation route.62
Japan proposes addition of a sentence at the end of para 1 of Article 22 as indicated
below.
“If, assessing the detailed status report provided under paragraph 6(b) of Article 21,
the complaining party considers that the Member concerned is unable to implement the
recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of time, the complaining party
may request negotiations with the Member concerned, with a view to developing mutually
acceptable  compensation.    The  Member  concerned  shall,  if  so  requested,  enter  into
negotiations with the complaining party within 20 days from the date of the request, unless
it declares its confidence in full compliance within the reasonable period time”.
The European Communities has proposed an amendment to Article 22(2) to make
the compensation rule procedurally easier.  Under the EU proposal in the following four
situations  the  Respondent  shall,  if  so  requested  by  the  complaining  party,  enter  into
consultations with a view to agree on a mutually acceptable trade compensation:
1.  If the Member concerned does not notify DSB within the prescribed time limit its
intentions to implement the recommendations or rulings of the DSB
2.  The Member concerned does not notify within the stipulated time limit that it has
complied.
3.  The compliance panel or the Appellate Body report pursuant to Article 21bis find
that the Member concerned has not complied.
4.  The compliance panel or the  Appellate  Body report pursuant to  Article  21bis
finds that the Member concerned has not complied with the terms and conditions
of a mutually agreed solution notified under Article 3.6 that are subject to the
disciplines of a covered agreement.
The EC proposal also envisages that within thirty days from the date of request for
consultation,  the  Member  concerned  shall  submit  to  the  other  Member  a  proposal  of
mutually  acceptable  trade  compensation.    In  case  an  arbitration  had  taken  place,  the
proposal for compensation should be consistent with the award of the compensation.  The63
EC proposal further envisages that if no proposal for compensation is submitted within the
thirty days time limit prescribed or if no agreement is reached within thirty days from the
submission of the proposal, for a mutually acceptable compensation the complaining party
can  seek  authorization  to  suspend  concessions  or  other  obligations  under  covered
agreements.
The  basic  thrust  of  the  Ecuador  proposal  is  that  Article  21.3(c  )  should  be
broadened  so  that  the  arbitrator  while  fixing  a    reasonable  period  of  time  could  also
determine the annual level of nullification of impairment.  According to Ecuador, if the
compliance panel finds that the Member concerned has defaulted in compliance, then at the
time of the adoption of the compliance panel report, the Member concerned must propose a
compensation  package  equivalent  to  the  level  of  nullification  or  impairment  which  is
predetermined.  The Ecuador proposal also envisages, that at the time of adoption of the
report  by  the  DSB,    the  Member  concerned  must  obligatorily  propose  compensation
equivalent to the nullification and impairment suffered.
The main thrust of the African proposal is that the compensation should be in the
form of cash.
The proposal of the LDC group is that compensation should be mandatory. The
LDC proposal also states that compensation should not take the form of enhanced market
access, if this will prejudice other Members.  The LDC group also prefers compensation in
cash.
Jamaica suggests that with regard to developing country Members compensation
should  be  in  the  form  of  increased  market  access  in  agreed  sectors  of  the  developed
country member.
It may be not be desirable to make compensation mandatory as proposed by the
LDC group.  The Australian proposal is the one,  which we should be looked at seriously.
This proposal provides reiteration of some of the provisions already contained in the DSU64
and also provides for a remedy to deal with a situation when compensation package is not
worked out keeping in view MFN obligation.
The EC proposal is more procedural and does not deal with a situation where he
compensation package is not available on MFN basis.
It may not be desirable to insist that compensation should only be in the form of
cash.
The  existing  DSU  provides  that  losing  party  should  enter  into  negotiations  for
developing mutually acceptable compensation, if so requested by the prevailing party.  The
DSU also states that compensation is voluntary and if granted, shall be consistent with
covered agreements.  Some of the proposals on the table move in the direction of making
the  losing  party  compulsorily  offer  a  compensation  package  if  the  prevailing  party  so
requests.  I do not think it is wise to make compensation route obligatory.
In brief,  the Australian proposal with regard to compensation deserves support.  In
respect of other proposals on the table, the only element that could be supported is the one
which provides for determination of the level of nullification and impairment at an earlier
point of time as compared to the present situation, so that if both parties want to go down
the compensation route, the compensation could be fixed without delay.  In fact, an early
determination of the level of nullification and impairment will perhaps facilitate decision
by the parties involved with regard to the compensation.
IV.9  Determination of Compliance:
Article 21.5 of the DSU reads as follows:
“Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement  of  measures  taken  to  comply  with  the  recommendations  and  rulings  such
dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including
wherever possible resort to the original panel.  The panel shall circulate its report within 9065
days after the date of referral of the matter to it.  When the panel considers that it cannot
provide its report within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons
for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report.”
Experience gained so far in dealing with the provisions of Article 21.5 shows that
there is need for bringing about clarity with regard to the various elements in Article 21.5.
Article 21.5 states interalia that where there is a difference of opinion about compliance or
otherwise  with  the  rulings  and  recommendations  of  the  DSB,  such  a  dispute  shall  be
decided through recourse to these disputes settlement procedures.  In the past, differences
of opinion have arisen among WTO Members as to whether consultations are a pre-request
before asking for the establishment of a compliance panel.  While some delegations felt
that consultations are mandatory since normal dispute settlement procedures have to be
followed, others argued that there cannot be consultation for a period of 60 days, when the
compliance panel itself is expected to circulate its reports within 90 days.  In the past, there
have  also  been  differences  of  opinion  as  to  who  can  request  the  establishment  of  a
compliance panel.  In the Banana dispute, EC the losing party, sought the establishment of
a compliance panel with the hope of preventing US from taking recourse to Article 22.6
directly.  However, US objected to this on the ground that a losing party cannot seek the
establishment of a compliance panel.  The WTO Membership while generally in favour of
a multilateral determination of compliance or otherwise, has also been sensitive to the
concerns expressed that a losing party should not use the compliance panel mechanism to
get more time for implementation.  The other question relating to Article 21.5 has been the
question of appeal.  There is no explicit reference to the question of appeal in Article 21.5.
However, Article 17.1 and 17.4 are  worded generally and do not explicitly rule out the
possibility of an appeal from the finding of a compliance panel.  In specific disputes the
parties to the disputes have entered into a bilateral agreement providing for (a) the right of
the prevailing party to take recourse to Article 22.6 after the compliance panel gives its
report even though the time limit prescribed in Article 22.6 might have expired in the
meanwhile.  (b) possibility of appeal by either party after the receipt of compliance panels
findings.66
Both European Communities and Japan have submitted detailed proposals for a
new article under the title Article 21bis, “determination of compliance”.  Both EC and
Japan have made minor modifications to their original proposals in order to respond to
each other’s concerns as well as the concerns of other WTO Members.  The two proposals
are similar but not identical.  The starting point for both the proposals is that where there is
disagreement  between  the  complaining  party  and  the  Member  concerned  as  to  the
existence or consistency with a covered agreement of the measure taken to comply with the
recommendations  or  rulings  of  the  DSB,  such  disagreement  shall  be  resolved  through
recourse to dispute settlement procedures provided for in the proposed Article 21bis.
As far as the issue as to who can seek the establishment of a compliance panel both
proposals  indicate  it  is  the  complaining  party  who  can  seek  the  establishment  of  a
compliance panel.  This is natural since it is not likely that a Respondent would seek the
establishment  of  a  compliance  panel.    What  happened  in  the  Banana  case,  was  rather
unnatural.  In that case, the Respondent viz.EC sought the establishment of a compliance
panel merely to prevent US from taking recourse to Article 22.6 straight away on the plea
that the thirty days time limit has to be observed. Moreover, unlike at the time of the
Banana case, the sequencing issue is now more or less resolved in practice, if not through
an amendment to the DSU.  Moreover, the proposals regarding the timing of the request
for the establishment of a compliance panel is such that it would be natural and logical
only for the complaining party to request for the establishment of a compliance panel.
As far as the timing of the request is concerned the Japanese proposal does not
envisage any consultations before a request for establishment of a compliance panel is
made.  In fact, the Japanese proposal explicitly states “while consultations between the
Member concerned and the complaining party are desirable, they are not required prior to a
request for a compliance panel under paragraph 2”.  The Japanese proposal envisages that
the request for a compliance panel can be made anytime after (i) the Member concerned
states  that  it  does  not  need  a  reasonable  period  of  time  for  compliance  pursuant  to
paragraph 3 of Article 21; (ii) the Member concerned has submitted a notification pursuant
to paragraph 6(c ) of Article 21 that it has complied with the recommendations or rulings67
of the DSB; or (iii) ten days before the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time
whichever is  earlier. Such request shall be made in writing.
The EC’s original proposal had a similar provision but it was for the purpose of
seeking  consultations  and  not  for  the  establishment  of  a  panel  as  is  the  case  with  the
Japanese proposal.
There is an Indian-Indonesian proposal on the table stating that consultation should
be considered mandatory before seeking establishment of a compliance panel.
The EC has subsequently amended its proposal providing interalia consultations
under Article 21bis could be requested at any time after “Thirty days before the date of
expiry of the reasonable period of time”.  According to EC, since it has proposed that
consultations  should  be  held  within  20  days  and  since  their  latest  proposal  is  that
consultations could be requested for anytime after Thirty days before the date of expiry of
reasonable period of time, it would imply that, as in the Japanese proposal, a compliance
panel could be requested ten days prior to the end of reasonable period of time.
It is better  to  provide  for  consultations  before  the  stage  for  the  request  for  the
establishment of a compliance panel comes.  In this sense the EC proposal is better than
the  Japanese  proposal.  EC’s  proposal  also  provides  for  third  parties  joining  the
consultations.   The Japanese proposal gives a time period of 90 days for the compliance
panel to submit its report;  so does the EC proposal.  The demand contained in the Indian
proposal is to increase this period to 120 days.  Since, there is a serious concern among the
Membership that there should be a minimum scope in the system for the losing party to
delay implementation, it is better to give only 90 days time for the compliance panel. India
and others have given proposals separately for additional time for developing countries, for
making  their  submissions  before  their  panel  and  also  for  reasonable  period  of
implementation.  While these proposals cane be defended, it is difficult to argue in favour
of extending the time available to the compliance panel to do its work.  Understandably,
India’s proposal with regard to 120 days for the compliance panel is neutral as to whether68
the parties involved are developing or developed countries.  Perhaps, India need not press
this proposal too much.    Both the EC and Japanese proposal provide for appeal to the
Appellate body.  Both the proposals envisage that once the compliance panel and /or the
Appellate  body  find  that  the  Member  concerned  has  not  complied  with  DSB
recommendations  the  Member  concerned  will  not  be  entitled  for  any  further
implementation  time.    Both  the  proposals  envisage  that  the  compliance  panel  shall
establish its own working procedures and that most of the provisions of the DSU shall
apply to the compliance panels proceedings except to the extent that such provisions are
incompatible with the time frame provided in the proposed new Article 21bis or that the
new Article 21bis provides for more specific provisions.
To  sum  up,  EC’s  proposal  on  compliance  is  reasonable  and  deserves  to  be
supported.
IV.10  Sequencing between Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU
The “Sequencing” issue relates to the relationship between a decision by a WTO
Member  to  request  the  compliance  panel  (Article  21.5  of  the  Dispute  Settlement
Understanding)  to  rule  on  the  adequacy  of  implementing  measures  by  another  WTO
Member found to be inconsistent with its WTO obligations and the repercussions of such
decision to the former Member’s right to request authorization to adopt counter measures
(Article 22.2 and Article 22.6 of  DSU) provided for in the DSU.  The WTO case law
reveals different approaches on this subject.  The sequencing issue came into prominence
first in the Banana dispute.
Article 21.5 DSU reads:
“Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement  of  measures  taken  to  comply  with  the  recommendations  and  rulings  such
dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including
wherever possible resort to the original panel.  The panel shall circulate its report within 90
days after the date of referral of the matter to it. When the panel considers that it cannot69
provide its report within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons
for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report.”
Article 22.2 DSU reads: “If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found
to  be  inconsistent  with  a  covered  agreement  into  compliance  therewith  or  otherwise
comply  with  the  recommendations  and  rulings  within  the  reasonable  period  of  time
determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21, such Member shall, if so requested, and
no later than the expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with any
party  having  invoked  the  dispute  settlement  procedures,  with  a  view  to  developing
mutually acceptable compensation  If no satisfactory compensation  has been agreed within
20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked
the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the
application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements”.
Article 22.6 of the DSU reads as follows:
When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon request, shall
grant  authorization  to  suspend  concessions  or  other  obligations  within  30  days  of  the
expiry of the reasonable period of time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the
request. However, if the Member concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed, or
claims that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed
where a complaining party has requested authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to arbitration.
Such arbitration shall be carried out by the original panel,  if members are available, or by
an arbitrator
15 appointed by the Director-General and shall be completed within 60 days
after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time.  Concessions or other obligations
shall not be suspended during the course of the arbitration.
In the Banana dispute, US argued on the basis of the language of the first sentence
of  Article  22.6  that  the  WTO    Member  loses  his  right  to  suspend  concessions    other70
obligations unless he makes the request to DSB in such a way that the DSB is able to grant
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of
reasonable period of time.  Since, the compliance panel constituted under Article 21.5 of
the DSU has 90 days period to submit its report and since the time frame provided in
Article 22.6 is 30 days from the expiry of reasonable period of time, US argued that there
is  no  logical  sequencing  between  Article  21.5  and  Article  22.6  of  the  DSU.    This
effectively  meant  that  a  prevailing  party  can  unilaterally  determine  whether  the  losing
party has complied with the DSB’s recommendations in a  dispute  or  not  and  was  not
necessarily  obliged  to  seek  the  verdict  of  compliance  panel.    In  a  number  of  disputes
subsequent to the Banana dispute, parties have found creative solutions to ensure that a
multilateral  determination  of  compliance  or  otherwise  is  made  before  suspension  of
concessions actually takes place.  Almost all WTO Members are desirous of amending the
DSU so as to reflect a clear sequencing between Article 21.5 and Article 22 of the DSU.
Australia,  Jamaica,  European  Communities,  Ecuador  and  Japan  have  made
proposals on the sequencing issue.
Australia’s  proposal  is  that  DSB  should  adopt  a  decision  to  provide  for  an
understanding on agreed procedures, under Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU applicable to
all current disputes, (unless the parties have already entered into a bilateral understanding
for that dispute) and future Disputes. This understanding can be adapted for a particular
dispute at the agreement of both parties.  It would appear that Australia is proposing a
decision incorporating an understanding about sequencing rather than a clear amendment
of  the  relevant  provisions  because  of  some  constitutional  problems  it  faces  in  seeking
approval  for amendments to a Treaty already approved by its parliament.
The Jamaican proposal provides for a clear sequencing between Articles 21 and 22.
The EC have proposed a new Article called Article 21bis be inserted after Article
21.    This  new  Article  provides  for  detailed  procedures  where  there  is  disagreement
between  the  complaining  party  and  the  Member  concerned  as  to  the  existence  or71
consistency  with  a  covered  agreement  of  measures  taken  to  comply  with  the
recommendations or rulings of the DSB.  The first para of this new Article stipulates that
when there is a difference of opinion regarding compliance,  such  a difference shall    be
resolved only through a compliance panel. Besides, Para 9(ii) of Article 21bis proposed by
EC reads as follows:
(i) If  the  compliance  panel  or  the  Appellate  Body  report  finds  that  the  Member
concerned has failed to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered
agreement  into  compliance  therewith  or  otherwise  comply  with  the
recommendations or rulings of the DSB in the dispute within the reasonable period
of time, then:    
(ii) “after  circulation  of  the  compliance  panel  or  the    Appellate  Body  report,  a
complaining  party  that  was  a  party  to  the  compliance  proceeding  may  request
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements pursuant to Article
22.  The DSB shall grant authorization to such request only after the adoption of
the compliance panel or Appellate Body report”.
Japan has also proposed insertion of a new Article after Article 21, namely, Article
21bis, dealing with the subject of determination of compliance.  Japan’s proposal also
stipulates  that  differences  regarding  compliance  or  non-compliance  shall  be  resolved
through  a  compliance  panel.      Japan  has  also  proposed  that  Article  22.2  should  be
amended, interalia, in such a way that a complaining party can seek authorization of the
DSB to suspend concessions only if there is a finding by the compliance panel or the
Appellate Body that the Member concerned has failed to bring the measures found to be
inconsistent with a covered agreement into complaisance therewith or otherwise comply
with the recommendations or rulings of the DSB.72
Ecuador supports the approach of EC who have proposed a new Article, Article 21
bis  which  essentially  ensures  the  requirement  of  a  multilateral  determination  of  non-
compliance before resorting to suspension of concessions.
Right from the days of Banana dispute,  India has always been arguing that the
prevailing party cannot unilaterally determine as to whether the losing party has complied
with the recommendations of the DSB or not.  India has always maintained that where
there is a difference of opinion between the parties to the dispute as to whether the losing
party has complied with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB, the matter could be
adjudicated only by a compliance panel.  It has also been India’s consistent position that
there is a logical sequence between Article 21.5 and Article 22.6.  The effect of both EC
and Japanese Proposals is to provide for sequencing between Article 21.5 and Article 22,
though the approaches are slightly different.  EC brings in the thought of sequencing in
para 9(ii) of the proposed Article 21bis.  Japan has also proposed a new Article 21bis
which is similar to EC’s proposal is most parts.  However, Japan’s proposed Article 21bis
does not directly deal with sequencing as is done by EC through para 9(ii).  Japan has
proposed an amendment to Article 22.2 to achieve sequencing.    In fact, in the revised
proposals, EC  and  Japan  have  sorted  out  minor  differences,  which  were  there  in  their
original proposals.  It is appropriate for India can go along with either EC or Japanese
proposal  as  regards  sequencing.    However,  the  proposals  relating  to  compliance  and
sequencing are interrelated.  In respect of compliance, I have suggested support to EC’s
proposed Article 21bis, rather than Japan’s proposed Article 21bis.  EC’s proposed Article
21bis, incorporates elements relating to compliance as well as sequencing.  Therefore, for
the sake of convenience, it is better to go along with EC’s approach relating to sequencing
as incorporated in the proposed Article 21bis.
IV.11  Arbitration to Determine the level of Nullification or Impairment/Arbitration to
Suspend Concessions or other obligations.
In the present DSU, Articles 22.2 to 22 .7 deal with the suspension of concessions
or  other  obligations  under  the  covered  agreements.    Article  22.2  provides  that  if  no
satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry after a73
reasonable period of time, the prevailing party may seek authorization from the DSB to
suspend concessions  or  obligations  in  respect  of  the  Member  concerned.    Article  22.3
provides that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions in the same
sector and if this is not practical, it should seek to suspend concessions or other obligations
in other sectors under the same agreement.  If this is also not possible the complaining
party  can  seek  to  suspend  concessions  or  other  obligations  under  another  covered
agreement.  Basically, this provision tries to ensure that suspension of concessions takes
place in an orderly and hierarchical manner. Suspension of concessions should preferably
take place in the  same sector in which the violation had taken place, in other sectors under
the same agreement and under any other covered agreement, in that order.
Article 22.4 establishes the requirement of equivalence between the nullification or
impairment and suspension of concessions or other obligations.  Article 22.6 provides for
arbitration   when the Member concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed or
claims that Article 22.3 has not been followed.  Time provided to the arbitrator is sixty
days.
Article  22.7  provides  that  the  arbitrator  should  look  into  only  the  level  of
suspension  proposed  and  makes  sure  it  is  equivalent  to  the  level  of  nullification  or
impairment.    The  Arbitrator  can  also  check  whether  Article  22.3  has  been  followed.
Article 22.8 states that suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary
and shall only be applied until such time as the WTO inconsistent measure is removed.
A number of proposals have been made with regard to amendments to Article 22.
Some of these proposals deal with arbitration to determine the level of nullification or
impairment while other proposals deal with authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations.74
Arbitration to determine the level of nullification or impairment
The European communities have proposed additional sub-paragraphs at the end of
paragraph one in Article 22.  The idea behind this proposal is that at any point of time
before the submission of the request for authorization for suspension of concessions or
other  obligations  as  provided  for  in  Article  22.2,  the  parties  may  agree  to  request  for
arbitration to determine the level of nullification or impairment caused by the offending
measure.  The proposal covers further element like arbitration being carried out by the
original panel, 45 days time period for the arbitrator and the finality of arbitrators decision.
The proposal contemplates 45 days time period for the arbitrator.
The important thing about the EC proposal is that this course of action will be
triggered only if both parties  agree.  The basic motivation behind EC’s  proposal  is  to
facilitate the compensation route.  In fact, EC had proposed an amendment to Article 22.2
in which it is mentioned that when arbitration referred to in paragraph 1, has taken place
compensation proposal should be consistent with the award of the arbitrator.
Thailand and Philippines has proposed a detailed amendment to Article 22.7.  In
their proposal it is mentioned that in order to enable the arbitrator to determine whether the
level of suspension proposed is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, the
complaining party shall provide sufficient information on trade and data.  The proposal
also envisages that the complaining party shall submit to the Arbitrator a detailed proposal
containing a list of concessions or other obligations it intends to suspend, consistent with
the level of nullification or impairment determined by the arbitrator and with due respect to
paragraph 3 of Article 22.   The arbitrator will make sure that the level of suspension is
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.   The complaining party will submit
a  request  to  DSB  for  an  authorization  to  suspend  concessions  or  other  obligations
consistent with the decision of the arbitrator.  The most important aspect of the proposal by
Philippines and Thailand is that the complaining party cannot suspend concessions or other
obligations other than those contained in the list of concessions or other obligations on the
basis of which the arbitrator has determined that the level of suspension is equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment.  The complaining party cannot modify the list except75
by mutual agreement with the Member concerned or for technical purposes.  When the list
has  to  be  modified  for  technical  purposes  it  has  to  be  cleared  by  the  Arbitrator  and
approved by the DSB.  Basically, the proposal from Thailand and Philippines is designed
to ensure that “carousel”, a practice frequently resorted to by the United States, is not
permitted.    Before  the  Seattle  Ministerial  Conference,  both  EC  and  Japan  were  in  the
forefront  of  opposition  to  carousel.    However,  either  because  of  pressure  from  US  or
because of reluctance to displease US in any manner, they softened their opposition to
carousel.  But during the current stage of negotiations, it is found that EC is supportive of
Thailand and Philippines proposal designed to outlaw carousel.
The  main  thrust  of  proposal  by  Ecuador  is  that  that  the  mandate  or  terms  of
reference on arbitration set out in Article 21.3 (C ) of the DSU should be broadened by
determining an annual level of  level of nullification or impairment in addition to  fixing a
reasonable period of time for implementation.
Korea has proposed that Article 21.5 panel be required to determine a level of
nullification or impairment.
Authorization to Suspend Concessions or Other Obligations
Ecuador,  Japan,  European  communities  have  made  proposals  with  regard  to
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations.
Ecuador’s proposal  is  that  implementation  of  Article  22  of  the  DSU  should  be
allowed when (a) there is no disagreement regarding the fact that the Member concerned
has not complied;  (b) compensation has not been granted or (c ) a compliance panel has
found  that  the  party  concerned  did  not  comply.    Japan  has  proposed  amendments  to
paragraph2 and paragraph 6 as well as a new paragraph after paragraph 8, with consequent
re-numbering of existing paragraph 9 as paragraph 10.  The amendment proposed by Japan
to paragraph 2 of Article 22, basically provides that before a complaining party requests
the DSB authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations, there must be a finding76
by  a  compliance  panel  that  the  Member  concerned  has  not  complied  with  the  DSB’s
recommendations. (i.e. sequencing).
The  Japanese  amendment  to  Article  22.6  has  the  effect  of  reducing  the  time
available to the arbitrator to 45 days from 60 days.  The effect of a new sub paragraph
namely sub para 9 proposed by Japan is that it enables the Member concerned to request a
termination of the authorization given by the DSB for the suspension of concessions or
other  obligations  on  the  ground  that  it  has  eliminated  the  inconsistency  of  or  the
nullification  or  impairment  of  benefits  under  the  covered  agreements  identified  in  the
recommendations or rulings of the DSB.
The amendment proposed by the EC to paragraph 6 of article 22 has the effect of
reducing the time available to the arbitrator to 45 days.  The EC proposal also envisages
that the time available will be only 30 days if the arbitration procedure under paragraph 1
of the Article (that is determination of the level of nullification or impairment) had taken
place.
EC  has  also  proposed  an  additional  sentence  in  paragraph  8,  which  envisages
products which are on route before the date of application of the suspension of concessions
or other obligations shall be exempted from such suspension.  EC has also proposed a new
para, para 9 after para 8.  Basically, the purpose of this addition is to ensure that a Member
concerned  who  has  eliminated  the  inconsistency  or  the  nullification  or  impairments  of
benefits under the covered agreements identified in the recommendations or rulings of the
DSB has the possibility to request termination of the authorization given by the DSB for
suspension  of  concessions  or  other  obligations.    EC  has  proposed  that  the  Member
concerned may request termination of the authorization of suspension of concession or
other  obligations  given  earlier  by  the  DSB  on  the  ground  that  it  has  eliminated  the
inconsistency or the nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements.
EC’s proposal envisages that the DSB meeting 20 days after the receipt of the request shall
withdraw their authorization unless the complaining party objects to the withdrawal.  In
such a situation, the matter shall be resolved through recourse to Article 21bis.  If the77
compliance panel finds the claim of the Member concerned to be correct, the Member
concerned can request a meeting of the DSB, to be held ten days after the receipt of the
request and in that meeting the DSB shall withdraw the authorization unless it decides the
consensus not to do so.
In  the  event  of  the  compliance  panel  not  finding  the  claim  of  the  Member
concerned to be valid, and if the measures taken to comply by the Member concerned are
found  not  to  be  consistent  with  a  covered  agreement  or  not  to  comply  with  the
recommendations or rulings of the DSB in the dispute, any party may request an arbitration
to determine the level of nullification or impairment caused by the measures concerned.
Such  arbitration  shall  be  carried  out  by  the  original  panel,  as  far  as  possible  and  the
arbitrator  has  to  complete  the  job  within  45  days.    If  the  level  of  nullification  and
impairment  determined  by  the  arbitrator  in  this  situation,  differs  first  from  the  level
determined under the paragraph 6 of the Article the Member concerned can request for a
meeting of the DSB to modify the authorization for suspension of concessions or other
obligations.  At such meeting the DSB shall accordingly modify the authorization unless it
decides  by  consensus  not  to  do  so.    After  this,  the  complaining  party  shall  bring  the
suspension  of  concessions  and  other  obligations  into  conformity  with  the  modified
authorization of the DSB.
It would appear that EC’s proposal is designed to deal with a situation where a
losing party claims that it has taken  some measures to comply but is challenged by the
complaining party.
IV.12  Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement
The United States and Chile have submitted a Paper suggesting that there should be
mechanisms  that  would  enhance  the  parties’  flexibility  to  resolve  the  dispute  and
Members’  control  over  the  adoption  process.    In  their  proposal  US  and  Chile  have
suggested
(a)  making provisions for interim reports at the Appellate Body stage78
(b)  providing a mechanism for parties, after review of the interim report, to delete
the mutual agreement findings in the report that are not necessary or helpful to
resolve a dispute.
(c)  Some form of partial adoption procedure
(d)  Providing  the  parties  a  right,  by  mutual  agreement,  to  suspend  panel  and
Appellate body procedures
(e)  Ensuring that the Members of panels have appropriate expertise to appreciate
the issues presented in a dispute.
(f)  Providing some form of additional guidance to WTO adjudicative bodies
To say the least, the nature of US proposal takes one by surprise.  As  regards
introduction of interim review stage in the Appellate Body proceedings, it will be difficult
to accommodate this within the sixty days time limit.  Moreover, the Appellate Body deals
only with issues of law.  Obviously, the Appellate Body would give its legal findings after
taking into consideration the submissions on both sides regarding the legal issues before it.
It is unlikely that the interim review stage will add any value.  Even in the case of panel
procedures, one is hardly  aware  of  any  case  where  a  panel  fundamentally  changed  its
findings on the basis of comments received on its interim report.  It is surprising that US is
proposing to introduce interim review stage in the Appellate Body proceedings at a time
when a good number of delegations seem to feel that the interim review stage in the panel
proceedings should be dispensed with.
The proposal to delete some portions of the Appellate Body report, at the interim
review  stage,  by  mutual  consent  between  the  parties,  is  also  not  something  one  can
support.  If this idea is introduced, relatively weak Members may come under pressure
from the powerful ones to agree to delete some portions, thus, adversely affecting  the
credibility of the dispute settlement system.
The  proposal  regarding  partial  adoption  procedure,  in  my  view,  is  unrealistic.
There have been many situations where US single handedly supported some observations
in the Appellate Body report though every other Member felt that the Appellate Body had79
erred.  It is unlikely that certain portions of the Appellate Body report could be de-linked
from their relevance to the findings.  It looks as though this partial adoption suggestion is
being made with a view to test the mood of Members with regard to automaticity of the
dispute settlement system of the WTO.  India should never agree to any proposal, which
would  even  remotely  have  adverse  implications  for  the  automaticity  of  the  dispute
settlement system,
Again the proposal to suspend the panel and appellate body procedures by mutual
agreement is rather risky since weaker parties may come under pressure.
Another element of the US proposal relates to the panelists.   The  US  proposal
implies that the panelists, selected under the present system, do not have the necessary
expertise. However, the US proposal is silent as to how it could be ensured that panelists
possess the required expertise.  In this connection it is recalled tat US has not been in
favour of EC proposal with regard to permanent panelists.
The last element of the US proposal says that some form of additional guidance,
should be provided to WTO adjucative bodies regarding the nature and task presented to
them as well as rules of interpretation of the WTO agreements.  This element of the US
proposal appears to cover panels, as well as the Appellate Body.  In other words, US is
suggesting that Members should provide  guidance to the Appellate  Bodies on  rules of
interpretation of WTO agreements!  When the Appellate Body argue, in the context of
Amicus Curiae briefs that the Appellate Body is entitled to do anything as long as it is not
prohibited.  the  US  delegation  was  the  only  delegation  which  supported  this  strange
interpretation in today US is suggesting Members should give guidance to Appellate Body
on interpretation of WTO agreements.
It appears to me that US has submitted this paper because it has lost a number of
disputes  in  the  last  one  year  or  so.    Some  people  believe  tat  US  somehow  wants  to
eliminate or reduce the automoticity of the dispute settlement system.80
In my view the US paper deserves to be vehemently opposed.  If the US proposals
go through, it will be the beginning of the end of the dispute settlement system as it exists
now.   Many developing countries, might have their own concerns or problems with the
dispute settlement system.  But they should appreciate that what the US is attempting is a
fundamental change in the system, which would be to the detriment of weaker players.
V  Conclusions
Basing  on  the  discussions  relating  to  various  proposals,  the  following  broad
conclusions emerge:
1.  With regard to permanent body of panelists, advantage lies in having a combination
of the present system and the system proposed by the European Communities (EC).
Under this system a roster of Panel Chairpersons should be established by the DSB.
The parties to the dispute can mutually agree on the panel composition, with the
stipulation  that  the  parties  cannot  choose  any  name  from  the  roster  of  Panel
Chairpersons.    If  within  twenty  days,  the  parties  cannot  mutually  agree  on  the
composition of the panel, the responsibility for composition should pass on to the
DG.  The DG will compose the panel by choosing the Panel Chairperson from the
roster  of  Panel  Chairpersons  on  the  basis  of  a  formula,  which  would  eliminate
scope  for  discretion  or  manipulation.    DG  will  choose  the  other  two  or  four
Members  from  the  indicative  list.  In  composing  the  Panel  Article  8  (3)  should
continue to be respected.   As far as qualifications for the Panelists are concerned
Article 8(1) provides the requisite guidance and there should not be any attempt to
follow a more restrictive approach.
2.  As regards Amicus Curiae Briefs, strong opposition could continue to be expressed
against providing for the possibility of Amicus Curiae submissions in the WTO
dispute  settlement  process.    However,  in  order  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  the
stalemate  in  the  DSU  negotiations  on  this  subject  resulting  in  a  situation  of
enabling  the  Appellate  Body  to  continue  with  its  current  approach  to  Amicus81
Curiae Briefs on the specious argument that what is not explicitly prevented by
DSU is permissible,  a possible compromise will be to provide for the possibility of
considering Amicus Curiae Briefs, subject to certain conditions, at the panel stage
but not at the Appellate stage.  The procedure suggested by EC for consideration of
Amicus  Curiae  submissions,  incorporating  a  two  stage  approach  is  reasonable.
Acceptance of the idea of giving consideration to Amicus Curiae Briefs to the panel
stage  should  be  contingent  upon  taking  an  accompanying  decision  which  will
prevent the Appellate Body from misinterpreting the DSU and considering Amicus
Curiae Briefs at the Appellate stage.  The compromise relating to Amicus Curiae
Submissions will lapse after three years unless there is a consensus to extend the
period.
3.  There is need and scope for enhancing third party rights in the dispute settlement
process.  A  right  to  join  in  the  consultations  when  there  is  substantial  interest,
entitlement to receive all information and documents and a right to presence at all
substantive meetings of the panel are some of the elements of third party rights
which deserve support.  However, third parties need  not  be  given  the  rights  to
comment on descriptive part or the interim report.  There need be no stipulation
that the panel should discuss all arguments of third parties.  With regard to Article
17.4 proposals by Costa Rica and India are in the right direction since they seek to
remove the existing anomalies.
4.  The proposal that secretariat input to the panel should be made available to the
parties to the dispute deserves support. In respect of the proposal to open up panel
meetings to the public, it could be legitimately argued that the priority should be to
throw open meetings of regular WTO bodies like the General Council to the public
and opening up panel and Appellate Body proceeding should come at a later stage.
Any  possible  decision  to  open  up  meetings  of  WTO  bodies  and/or  panel  and
Appellate Body proceedings to the general public could be a time limited decision
subject to extension by consensus.82
5.  The proposal that mutually agreed solutions should be notified within sixty days
from  the  date  of  the  agreement  and  that  relevant  notification  should  contain
sufficient details is a good proposal.  In addition, it should be suggested that failure
to comply with this obligation would have the effect of disabling the parties from
invoking dispute settlement procedures in respect of the particular matter.
6.  Any proposal for amending Article 17.1 of the DSU with a view to increase the
number of Appellate Body members either immediately or with a view to provide
for the possibility of increasing the number of Appellate Body members in future
should be strongly opposed. The proposal by India and others that the Appellate
Body members should be eligible for a non-renewable single term of six years is a
good proposal.  Similarly, the proposal that the Appellate Body should develops
guidelines as to the details to be included to the notice of appeal is a good proposal.
7.  The proposal to invest the Appellate Body with remand powers is a good one but
certain methodologies have to be worked out to ensure that this authority is not
misused.  The Australian proposal with regard to compensation deserves support.
The only  element in other  proposals  that  could  be  supported  is  the  one, which
provides for determination of the level of nullification and impairment at an earlier
point of time as compared to the present situation.
8.  With  regard  to  determination  of  compliance  EC’s  proposal  is  reasonable  and
deserves to be supported.
9.  There is a defacto recognition now of sequencing between Articles 21.5 and 22 of
the DSU.  The proposals of EC and Japan with regard to sequencing are almost
identical.    Since  the  proposals  relating  to  compliance  and  sequencing  are
interrelated, it is better to go along with EC’s approach relating to sequencing as
incorporated in the proposed Article 21bis, which incorporates elements relating to
compliance as well as sequencing.83
10.  The proposed amendment to Article 22.7 by Thailand and Philippines, which has
the effect of outlawing “carousel”, deserves strong support.
11.  The US and Chile proposal titled “improving flexibility and Member control in
WTO  dispute  settlement”,  which  incorporates  elements  like  partial  adoption
procedure, providing additional guidance to the WTO adjudicating body, etc., will
have the effect of undermining the critical elements of the present DSU and should
therefore be strongly opposed.
It will be appropriate to utilize the opportunity provided by the DSU negotiations to
bring about certain improvements in the DSU as indicated above.